
THE 
CAUSES AND 



MEANING OF 

THE GREAT 

WAR. 




WILBUR E GORDY 







Class 

Book 

fopyrigtaN 



Y I 



CDEYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



THIS BOOK IS ENDORSED BY THE CONNECTICUT COUN- 
CIL OF DEFENSE AFTER BEING READ AND APPROVED 
BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE. 




From a photograph copyright by Underwood and Underwood 
PRESIDENT WILSON 



THE CAUSES 

AND MEANING OF THE 

GREAT WAR 



BY 

WILBUR F. GORDY 



it 

AUTHOR OF "ABRAHAM LINCOLN," "AMERICAN LEADERS AND HEROES," " STORIES OF EARLY 

AMERICAN HISTORY," " STORIES OF LATER AMERICAN HISTORY," "AMERICAN 

BEGINNINGS IN EUROPE," " COLONIAL DAYS," " AMERICAN EXPLORERS." 

" ELEMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES," " A HISTORY 

OF THE UNITED STATES FOR SCHOOLS" 



CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO 

ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO 



N\ 






Copyright, 1919, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



SB* &ftft 




r 



©CI.A536128 



PREFACE 

The principal reason for the teaching of history 
is to explain the meaning of human life, and in this 
way to reveal to the learner his relations to the 
social and moral world of which he is a part. The 
understanding thus afforded is the best equipment 
possible for intelligent and useful service in the co- 
operative life and work of a democracy like ours. 

With this conception of the function and value 
of history and of the importance of making clear to 
American boys and girls our national ideals as well 
as our international relations and responsibilities, the 
author has prepared this book, upon request of the 
Connecticut State Council of Defense, for use in 
the upper grammar grades and the lower classes of 
high schools. Emphasis has been put upon the 
reasons why our country entered the conflict and 
the large part she played in winning victory for the 
cause of democracy and humanity. 

One of the author's aims has been to show how the 
new Germany, which came into being in 1871 as 
the outcome of three 'SUT#esSf©Twars, differed from 
the old, and how her wonderful material success led 
to an intense desire for world conquest and world 
domination. 

Furthermore, it has been his purpose to show that 
this great war, spreading far outside of the limits of 



vi PREFACE 

the countries in which it started, was the outward 
expression of a world revolution in men's thoughts — 
one that must profoundly influence not only the 
ideals and purposes of Europe, but those of America 
and the entire world. American boys and girls 
should understand what this revolution signifies to 
the United States, and also how it is likely to affect 
the relations of the United States with other nations. 
They should gain some conception of what we have 
come to be as a great free country. They should 
acquire some knowledge as to our duty to co-operate, 
in the spirit of friendship and good-will, with other 
countries for the social, moral, and political better- 
ment of humanity. 

If this book proves helpful to intelligent citizen- 
ship and patriotic service, the author's aim in writing 
it will be realized. 

In closing, I wish to acknowledge my deep obliga- 
tions to Miss Elizabeth P. Peck, of the Hartford 
Public High School, and to Mr. Forrest Morgan, 
of the Watkinson Library, Hartford, both of whom 
have read the manuscript and have offered many 
valuable suggestions; and especially to my wife, 
whose cordial co-operation and constructive criticism 
have done much to give the book whatever merit 
it may possess. 

Wilbur F. Gordy. 

Hartford, Connecticut, 
June 14, 1914. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century . . 1 

II. Bismarck and the New Germany 10 

III. William II and the Mad Ambition of Ger- 

many for World Domination 15 

IV. Bitter Antagonism Between Germany and 

England 20 

V. Pan-Germanism and Its Dazzling Vision . . 31 

VI. How the Balkan Wars Menaced Pan-Ger- 
manism 43 

VII. Why Germany and Austria-Hungary Wished 

to Crush Serbia 58 

VIII. Why and How Germany and Austria Brought 

on the World War 63 

IX. Some Striking Events of the War 72 

X. Our Country Enters the War 92 

XI. A New World 132 

Principal Events of the War ....... 143 

Index 153 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

President Wilson Frontispiece 

PAGE 

Prince Bismarck 5 

William II 17 

The Market Square, Sparta . '.■ 47 

Buffalo Teams, Sofia 55 

Serbian Women 61 

Foreign Secretary Balfour 69 

The Ruins of Louvain 73 

King Albert 75 

Marshal Joffre 77 

The Ruins of Verdun 83 

Constantinople 85 

Admiral Beatty 89 

Admiral Jellicoe 91 

Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener 95 

Rheims Cathedral . . • 101 

Food Administrator Hoover 105 

Admiral Sims 107 

Clearing for Action 109 

An American Aviation Station Showing Fifteen Seaplanes 

Arriving and Departing 113 

Ship-Building at Hog Island 115 

General von Ludendorff 117 

ix 



x ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Tanks Passing Through a Wood on the British Front in 

France 119 

Marshal Foch . 121 

General Cadorna 123 

General Diaz 127 

General Pershing 129 

Premier Lloyd George 133 

Premier Clemenceau 137 



MAPS 



PAGE 



Map Showing the Berlin to Bagdad Railroad 41 

Balkan States, 1913 57 

Routes of the German Armies through Belgium .... 74 

Map Showing the Western Front . . 78 

The Eastern Theatre of War 81 

The Turkish Theatre of War 84 

Map of Italian Campaign 124 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF THE 
GREAT WAR 

CHAPTER I 

NATIONALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 

i. The Causes of the Great War. — To find the The murder 
causes of the Great War beginning in 1914, and duke^f Aus- 
to explain its meaning, we must go back to the caused/the 
last century. For we should remember that the ultimatum 

. . sent to Ser- 

conflicting forces which manifest themselves in bia 
deadly struggles on land or sea have always their 
beginnings long before the outbreak of the war 
itself. 

The assassination of Ferdinand, Archduke of 
Austria, and his wife in Serajevo on June 28, 
1914, was not the real cause of the ultimatum 
which Austria sent to Serbia forcing upon her 
national annihilation either by direct surrender 
of her independence or by a war against over- 
whelming odds. The murder of this Austrian 
prince furnished only the pretext which Austria 
had been seeking ever since the end of the Second 
Balkan War in 1913. There had been bitter and 
burning hatred between the two countries, and this 
had a definite relation to European rivalries, 
jealousies, and national ambitions, which cannot 

1 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



National 
unity and 
national ex- 
pansion 



The com- 
plete union 
of all parts 
of Italy 



be understood without at least a brief reference to 
events occurring many years before the Great War 
began. 

2. Two Movements which Altered the Balance 
of the European World. — After the overthrow of Na- 
poleon, in 1815, there were five great Powers in 
Europe — Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia. This situation remained without 
much change, though with some difference in rela- 
tive strength, for nearly sixty years. Then fol- 
lowed two world-wide movements which altered the 
entire balance of the Powers in Europe. The first of 
these movements was toward national unity and 
the second toward national expansion. As ex- 
amples of growth toward national unity, it will be 
sufficient for the purposes of this book to make 
brief mention of three countries — Italy, the United 
States, and Germany. 

3. Growth Toward National Unity in Italy. — Italy 
had been for ages a mere " geographical expression." 
It was not a single state, like Spain or France, but 
was made up of several unconnected sovereignties, 
the rulers including an Italian king, a Spanish king, 
two Austrian archdukes, and the Roman pontiff, 
the richest provinces being directly ruled by Austria. 
For many years patriots had. striven to make of 
these several divisions a united Italy. In 1821, 
1831, and 1848-1850, they had carried on armed 
and bitter contests for this ideal, and in 1859 
they had enlisted France in their cause. The 



THE GREAT WAR 3 

struggle ended in 1870 with the complete union of 
all parts of Italy into a single kingdom, a constitu- 
tion and a national parliament being established. 
The Italian Victor Emmanuel was made king. 

4. Our Own Civil War a Struggle for National Our Civil 
Solidarity. — Within the period of this struggle in victoryfor" 1 
Italy our own Civil War was fought. This war, as ^Jy nal 
you know, was the outward expression of two con- 
flicting political ideals — that of sectionalism and 

that of nationalism. The South stood for section- 
alism, based upon the principle of state sovereignty, 
while the other parts of the country stood for na- 
tionalism. The antagonism between these ideals 
had existed since the adoption of the Constitution, 
and found most ardent expression through our lead- 
ing statesmen. In the South Jefferson and Cal- 
houn had been the most conspicuous advocates of 
state sovereignty, while in the North, long before 
the Civil War took place, Jackson and Webster had 
openly proclaimed the preservation of the Union. 
After four years, 1861-1865, the war ended in 
victory for national unity, and there was no 
doubt that the sentiment of the American people 
overwhelming^ favored national solidarity. 

5. Austria and Prussia Rivals for Leadership in The infa- 
Germany. — The next country to form a union of its S°" biood Cy 
many states was Germany. The most important andiron " 
of the German states at this time were Austria and 
Prussia, and they had long been rivals for leader- 
ship. Through skilful and unscrupulous methods, 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Bismarck's 
desire to ex- 
pel Austria 
from the 
German 
body 



Bismarck's 
guiding prin- 
ciple : " The 
end justifies 
the means " 



Prussia finally won in the struggle, her leadership 
being established by Otto von Bismarck and his 
infamous policy of " blood and iron." 

6. Bismarck's Purpose the Consolidation of the 
German States Under the Leadership of Prussia. — 
When this powerful but unprincipled leader first 
came into prominence as the head of the Prussian 
ministry, under William I, in 1862, his purpose 
was the consolidation of the several German states 
into one mighty empire under the dominating 
leadership of Prussia. But as Austria was then 
the leading German Power, and too huge and 
conglomerate to make a subservient part of that 
empire, Bismarck's first step was to crush and expel 
her from the German body. 

7. Bismarck's Brutal Policy of " Blood and Iron." — 
To carry out his purpose a powerful army, per- 
fectly disciplined and superbly equipped, was 
necessary, and to secure it the taxes were vastly 
increased. To this increase the Liberals in the 
Prussian Landtag strenuously objected. But he 
was not at all dismayed by the bitter and 
violent opposition he had to meet. They threat- 
ened to hang Bismarck. Although challenged again 
and again to the duel field he remained un- 
moved. Thrusting aside those who stood in his 
pathway, he silenced the press at will; he bullied 
the Landtag. He scornfully referred to his 
opponents as "mere pedants," and with brutal 
frankness exclaimed: "The making of Germany 




PRINCE BISMARCK 



6 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Bismarck's 
open defi- 
ance of con- 
stitutional 
rights 



is a matter not of speechifying or parliamentary 
majorities; but of blood and iron." By this he 
of course meant that his aims were to be achieved 
not by argument or by moral suasion, but by 
the use of bayonets and bullets on the battle- 
field. The triumph of his master, the Prussian 
king ; and of his country, the Prussian state, was to 
be brought about by any methods he could devise, 
his guiding principle being: "The end justifies 
the means." 

For four years he took the money he needed, in 
utter disregard and in open defiance of constitu- 
tional rights. He could safely do this because the 
army, which was wholly at the king's disposal, 
protected him against a possible revolution on the 
part of the people. This same army, enlarged 
and improved, was his chief instrument in carry- 
ing out this policy of "blood and iron" outside 
the kingdom. 

8. The War with Denmark (1864). — By able, crafty, 
and audacious diplomacy, in which he overmatched 
all the rulers and chancellors of rival states, he 
brought on, in rapid succession, three wars during 
a period of seven years. In the first of these (1864) 
Denmark was speedily overcome and the North 
Sea coast brought under control. Criticism at 
home of his unjust methods were stifled on ac- 
count of the spoils of war. 

9. The War with Austria (1866). — Austria had 
joined Prussia in the war and shared in these spoils; 



THE GREAT WAR 7 

but in the second war (1866) Prussia defeated Aus- Austria 

tria ; took back the share of Danish plunder which withdraw 

had been given her, and then forced many other fr r ° m ^ 

German states into a new North German Confed- German 

states 

eration with the King of Prussia at its head. There 
was formed a second confederation also, which 
included the four states in South Germany — Ba- 
varia; Wiirtemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden. 
Compelled to withdraw from membership in the 
group of German states, Austria shortly afterward 
united with Hungary to form the Dual Empire 
of Austria-Hungary. The first part of Bismarck's 
great purpose had been achieved. Austria had 
been pushed out. 

Thus did Prussia suddenly rise to a leading posi- Prussia fills 
tion among the great Powers of Europe; and her position m 
people, in pride and self-confidence, were now Euro P e 
ready to grant their dictator all that he wished 
in planning still greater conquests. 

10. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). — One Bismarck, 
more war was fought not only for the purpose goads™ ' 
of defeating France, but for that of fusing the * r a a r nceint0 
two German confederations into one consolidated 
union, with Prussia in the position of ruler. This 
was the Franco-Prussian War, begun in 1870, which 
Bismarck brought on, as he himself asserts, by 
deliberately falsifying the report of an interview 
between the Prussian king and the French am- 
bassador. Bismarck played this trick upon the 
French people to goad them into war, knowing 



8 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



The Ger- 
mans con- 
quer France 



The Ger- 
mans force 
upon France 
a humiliat- 
ing treaty 



The plan to 
reduce 
France to a 
small state 



well that Prussia was thoroughly prepared to fight 
and that France was not. 

Like the conflict between Prussia and Austria, 
this war was brief; for within six weeks the French 
were disastrously defeated by the German armies. 
The Germans captured the French emperor, and 
at the end of seven months they were in possession 
of Paris and had conquered France. 

ii. The Germans Force Upon France a Humiliating 
Peace. — Then the Germans forced upon France a 
humiliating and, as they supposed, ruinous peace. 
She was compelled to pay 5,000,000,000 francs (a 
billion dollars) as a war indemnity; to give up 
Alsace and Lorraine, French provinces lying close 
to the German border, which were invaluable for 
their mines of coal, iron, and potash, and which 
included the old French district of Metz, the 
strongest fortress in western Europe. France was 
also compelled to make a commercial treaty with 
Germany, which for over forty years crippled 
French export trade and increased German im- 
ports. A condition of the treaty was that northern 
France was to be occupied by German troops until 
the indemnity was paid, and as Bismarck had fixed 
this indemnity at what he believed was an impos- 
sible sum for France to pay, he believed that the oc- 
cupied region would remain permanently a German 
possession. France would thus be reduced to a small 
state which could not stand in Germany's way. 

But France heroically bent every energy to pay- 



THE GREAT WAR 9 

ing this indemnity quickly, and within two and a Effects of 
half years the vast sum had been raised; moreover, demSty up- 
through her titanic efforts to create new industries JJJJ/q^. 6 
she rose to a great new prosperity. Germany, on many 
the other hand, suffered a temporary relaxation 
and decline as a result of the extravagance caused 
by this unearned wealth, and after long years her 
wrong-doing proved a bitter curse. 

12. The Creation of a New Germanic Empire. — 
The most marked immediate result of the Franco- 
Prussian War was the new Germanic empire that 
was created. The King of Prussia was crowned 
German Emperor — not, as often styled, Emperor 
of Germany — as the head of all the German states 
and thus the second part of Bismarck's great 
purpose had been achieved. 

13. " It Pays to Make War " Is the Foolish Con- Out of the 
elusion of the German People. — You may well note ^ts the 1 " 
the important fact that in all the wars just referred German 
to it was the almost perfect Prussian military ma- emerges 
chine, aided to some extent by troops from the 

other German states, that swept away with crush- 
ing force all opposition; and that out of the three 
conflicts emerged the German Empire, with Prussia 
dominant and Bismarck all - powerful. Having Bismarck a 
now became a popular idol, Bismarck by his policy popular ldo1 
of "blood and iron," of treachery and fraud, ac- 
complished his great purpose. He had proven 
to the satisfaction of the German people that a 
well-trained," well-equipped army was a good in- 



10 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



vestment for the country. It pays to make war 
was their foolish conclusion based upon the 
hazardous idea that they were sure always to win. 



CHAPTER II 
BISMARCK AND THE NEW GERMANY 



The new 

German 

Empire the 

greatest 

military 

Power in 

Europe 



Bismarck 
needs a 
period of 
peace 



Rapid 
growth in 
population 



14. The Beginning of a New Epoch in European 
and in German History. — The victory over France 
was the beginning of a new epoch in Europe as 
well as in Germany, for the new German Empire, 
being the greatest military Power in Europe, had 
secured, under the leadership of Prussia, unrivalled 
military prestige on the Continent. It now be- 
came the leading aim of Bismarck to secure and 
maintain for Germany a dominating position in 
the field of European diplomacy. 

15. Bismarck Changes His Methods to Meet 
New Conditions and New Problems. — To achieve this 
end, he changed his policy to one of peace. Ger- 
many needed a period of freedom from war, in 
order to develop her imperial political institutions, 
and also to foster and strengthen her economic 
life. New conditions had arisen, and new problems 
were to be met. 

One of these was the rapid growth in popula- 
tion. Germany's prosperity had been attended 
by a large increase in the birth-rate. When the 



THE GREAT WAR 11 

Franco-Prussian War ended (1871), the population 
of the German Empire had been 41,000,000; by 
1900 it had risen to 56,000,000; and in 1911 it had 
grown to about 65,000,000, or more than 50 per 
cent in forty years. Of course, this exceedingly 
rapid growth brought about the problem of feed- 
ing, clothing, and otherwise supporting the greatly 
enlarged nation. 

Another problem was the rise of the industrial The rise of 
class. Before 1871, Germany had been for the SaUiass" 
most part dominated by the agricultural interests. 
But after that year, through the mineral wealth 
she had acquired in Alsace-Lorraine, the number 
of those engaged in industry began to increase by 
leaps and bounds; and her industrial leaders de- 
manded a share in the political control of the em- 
pire. They attained their end, although they were 
forced to overcome the fierce resistance of the land- 
holders, or Junkers. 

Furthermore, there was a remarkable shifting of a remark- 
the population from rural sections to urban cen- *f foepopu- 
tres, as in many other countries at that time, and lation 
this trend of population cityward both increased 
the difficulty of providing the necessaries of life for 
the whole nation and also required that labor must 
be provided in the cities for the ever-growing army 
of workers. 

16. The Marked and Even Revolutionary Results ^piSym- 

of the New Conditions. — The results — industrial, so- creases her 

material 

cial, and political — of these new conditions were wealth 



12 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Germany's 
need of 
foreign 
markets 



Germany 
requires a 
correspond- 
ing expan- 
sion in her 
merchant 
marine 



Striking 
increase in 
German 
shipping 



marked and even revolutionary. Many new and 
varied industries were built up and organized as 
rapidly as possible; and by skilfully applying to 
these industries the principles of science and art 
Germany increased her material wealth with as- 
tounding rapidity. 

17. Expansion of German Industries Involves the 
Development of an Extensive Commerce and a Cor- 
responding Expansion in the Merchant Marine. — 
Expansion of industries involved other activities. 
Industries demanded , raw materials, nearly all of 
which Germany had to get from outside her own 
boundaries; and when the raw materials were made 
into finished goods, these had to find markets, 
some at home, but most in foreign lands. 

With an extensive foreign commerce, which was 
the outgrowth of her industries, Germany required 
a corresponding expansion in her merchant marine; 
for she wished to control her own carrying trade. 
Here again her merchants and capitalists showed 
marked efficiency, and this was especially evident 
in the building of the Kiel Canal, connecting the 
North and the Baltic Seas. To control the site 
of such a canal was the chief object in making war 
on Denmark (1864) and in seizing the provinces 
of Schleswig-Holstein, through which the canal 
was cut. 

In 1871 nearly all German shipping had to clear 
from Baltic ports; by 1900 — striking increases 
having been made in the nineties — her vessels 



THE GREAT WAR 13 

numbered more than 4,000, her merchant marine 
surpassing that of any nation in the world except 
Great Britain; and in 1905 over 7,000 vessels of 
all nations, but largely German, cleared from Kiel 
alone, a port which had grown from some 30,000 
inhabitants in 1870 to 150,000 in 1905. 

18. Germany Stupendously Increases Her Wealth Germany 
and Steadily Grows in Material Efficiency. — With this ^wealth 
rapid enlargement in economic life, Germany was a°d S stu- ly 
not only supporting her rapidly increasing popula- pendously 
tion — so that emigration had nearly ceased — but 

she was stupendously adding to her wealth. Her 
steady growth in material efficiency was due not 
only to great skill in applying scientific principles 
to agriculture and to production in her industries, 
but to the thoroughness with which she trained 
her workmen, her salesmen, men in every walk in 
life, with a view to making them more efficient in 
their assigned vocations. 

19. The Idealism of the Old Germany Gives Place Materialism 
to Gross Materialism. — In the expansion of her eco- German 
nomic life, her wealth-producing power, Germany ^JJ^wl 
never lost sight of the material advancement of universities, 

. . and every 

her people. Her all-absorbing desire was for ma- field of na- 
terial wealth and the power that comes with such deavor 
wealth. Her aspiration for the finer things of the 
spirit was almost wholly giving way to gross ma- 
terialism, which dominated her schools, her uni- 
versities, and every field of national endeavor. 
Even humane sentiment, which has done so much 



14 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Germany 
must be the 
overlord of 
the Conti- 
nent 



The Triple 
Alliance a 
great tri- 
umph of 
Bismarck's 
diplomacy 



for modern progress in many other lands, was 
openly derided in her Reichstag, her press, and 
also her pulpits, as either the cowardly self-interest 
of slavish weaklings or a hypocritical screen for ex- 
ploitation. The idealism of the old Germany of 
the days before Bismarck was fast disappearing. 

20. Bismarck's Reason for Desiring a Period of 
Peace. — In order to accomplish the smooth work- 
ing of these colossal economic changes that were to 
create a new Germany, a period of peace, as we 
have already noted, was necessary. To secure it 
and also to maintain the commanding position 
of Germany on the Continent which her military 
victories over Austria and France had given her, 
Bismarck, as we have said, sought aid in diplomacy. 
For it was indispensable that Germany should 
maintain her prestige as the predominant power 
in Europe. She must be the overlord, the inter- 
national dictator, of the Continent. 

Bismarck's Great Triumph in Bringing About 



21 



the Triple Alliance. — With this great end in view, 
Bismarck made an alliance first with Austria- 
Hungary and then with Italy, forming what was 
known as the Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance, 
signed in 1883, was perhaps the greatest triumph 
of Bismarck's astute diplomacy. For so long as 
he could rely on the friendly support, or even the 
neutrality and open markets, of Austria-Hungary 
and Italy, and at the same time keep up the rivalry 
and antagonism between England and France on 



THE GREAT WAR 15 

the one hand and England and Russia on the 
other — a rivalry and antagonism which grew out 
of conflicts arising through colonial expansion — 
Germany's mastery in European political relations 
would be undisputed and irresistible, and the old 
balance of power in Europe could never be re- 
stored. This situation Bismarck was able to main- 
tain until the end of his career, and it continued for 
many years afterward. 



CHAPTER III 

WILLIAM II AND THE MAD AMBITION OF GER- 
MANY FOR WORLD DOMINATION 

22. William II Dismisses Bismarck as Chancellor. The Kai- 
— TWerf ul though Bismarck was, and great as were tomie "* 
his achievements, he was at last obliged to give 
way to one whose authority was greater than his 
own. This was the new ruler of the Fatherland, 
William II, who was crowned King of Prussia and 
German Emperor in 1888. His more familiar title, 
is the Kaiser. Two years after ascending the 
throne he dismissed Bismarck, so as to become in 
reality his own foreign minister; and after that time 
the chancellor was expected to carry out the Kai- 
ser's bidding. In fact, the "will to rule" of 
William II was so overbearing that he would not 
tolerate a minister with any independence of 
thought or action. 



16 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



The Kai- 
ser's atti- 
tude toward 
the German 
army 



The Kai- 
ser's atti- 
tude toward 
the German 
people 



Obedience 
to the Kai- 
ser a relig- 
ious duty 



23. The Autocratic Kaiser. — The Kaiser's power 
was practically absolute in Prussia, and over the 
whole of Germany his rule was autocratic. He 
was the head of the German army, which he re- 
garded as the instrument with which to carry out 
his will. Of this he left no doubt in the minds of 
his subjects. In 1891, in an address to a body of 
military recruits, he said: "You are my soldiers. 
You have given yourselves to me, body and soul. 
There is now but one enemy for you, and that is 
my enemy. In this time of Socialistic intrigue, it 
may happen that I may order you to fire on your 
brothers or fathers. God save us from it ! But 
in such a case you are bound to obey me without 
a murmur." 

His attitude toward the German people was 
tersely expressed in a sentence he inscribed in the 
visitors' book in the town hall in Munich: "The 
will of the King is the supreme law." On another 
occasion he said to the people: "Only one is master 
in this country; that is I. Who opposes me I will 
crush to pieces. All of you have only one will, 
and that is my will; there is one law, and that is 
my law." 

These utterances show that William II held him- 
self to be above the law and the people as having 
no rights except the one right of obeying him as 
their Kaiser, the one chosen of God, as he thought 
of himself, to think for them in matters of govern- 
ment and to rule them as he saw fit. He had un- 




WILLIAM II 



18 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



" Germany 
a world em- 
pire," says 
the Kaiser 



limited confidence in his own wisdom, and treated 
the German people as if they were incapable of 
thinking and acting for themselves. The masses 
were taught that obedience to the Kaiser was a 
religious duty ; . and that loyalty to him was loyalty 
to the Fatherland. 

24. Germany and World Empire. — The young 
emperor followed the policy of his great chancel- 
lor, Bismarck, in insisting that the prestige of 
Germany on the Continent should be maintained 
at all costs. He went even further. In one of 
his speeches he declared that Germany had become 
a world empire, and that she must shoulder the 
responsibilities of such an empire. 

25. The Kaisers Policy of Exploiting Unclaimed 
Savage Lands as German Colonies. — To this end he 
embarked whole-heartedly upon a policy which Bis- 
marck had disapproved as fraught with certainty 
of immense cost and world war, as well as, with 
uncertainty of result and with no likelihood of a 
compensating profit. This policy was the ex- 
ploitation of unclaimed savage lands as Ger- 
man "colonies," the purpose being to control 
the raw materials of industry and use these 
lands as military and supply bases for German 
force. 

By this means Germany's industry, her foreign 
trade, and her merchant marine were constantly 
increasing her wealth and power, until by 1895 
her commercial empire was world-wide. 



THE GREAT WAR 19 

26. The Navy a Striking Part of the Kaiser's " Our future 
World Policy. — This expansion of commerce de- s || » pon the 
manded a powerful navy, and the Kaiser at once 

set out to establish a programme of naval con- 
struction, which by a rapid growth transformed 
what was an insignificant nav} r in 1895 to one of 
the great navies of the world. 

The navy, in fact, became a dominant part of 
the Kaiser's all-absorbing "Welt Politik," or world 
policy. "Our future lies upon the sea," he said. 
At another time he proclaimed: "As my grand- 
father worked for the reconstruction of this army, 
so will I work without allowing myself to be 
checked to reconstitute this navy." 

27. The Relation between a Great Navy and In- An ambi- 
dustrial Expansion. — The relation between a great programme 
navy and a colonial empire built up by industrial 
expansion can be easily understood. Industries 
require markets, or foreign trade; extensive for- 
eign trade calls for a large merchant marine; and 

if the merchant marine is to be protected from 
unfriendly rivals, there must be a powerful navy. 
Yet while the argument that a powerful com- 
mercial nation must have a powerful fleet is readily 
admitted, at the heart of William's policy was some- 
thing far greater than commerce. It was the dream 
of colonial empire. By his programme, decided 
upon in 1898, and largely supplemented in 1900 
and again in 1906, it became evident that by 1920 



20 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

Germany could venture to challenge; with good hope 
of success, even the long-standing naval suprem- 
acy of Great Britain. 



CHAPTER IV 

BITTER ANTAGONISM BETWEEN GERMANY 
AND ENGLAND 

The Kaiser's 28. The Kaiser's Inordinate Longing for Teutonic 
SereaSof World-Power.— The words of the Kaiser, "Our 
the Father- future lies upon the sea/' are significant and il- 
luminating. They reveal his inordinate longing 
for Teutonic world-power, which was the under- 
lying motive in his attempt to extend German 
boundaries, and was the most conspicuous feature 
of his reign. 

He dreamed of a political empire for Germany 
which should be co-extensive with her commercial 
empire, and to make real his dream he pur- 
posed to build a navy strong enough to match 
that of Great Britain. His idea was well expressed 
by one of his statesmen who said that without 
an irresistible navy Germany was "like an eagle 
with one wing." 
A few 29. The German Plan for Naval Expansion Re- 

derstandthe garded with Consternation by Far-Sighted Military 
?h?Iate£n ger Men and Di P lomats in England.— This militant plan 
England for German naval expansion was regarded in Eng- 
land with regret, because it increased the burden 



THE GREAT WAR 21 

of maintaining the superiority needful to safe- 
guard their ocean-sundered commonwealth spread 
over the entire globe; but it caused little uneasi- 
ness and no fear of its hostile intent, up to the very 
declaration of war, except among a few far-sighted 
military men and diplomats. These few men re- 
garded this naval rivalry with nothing short of 
consternation. They knew that a great nation 
would not pour out her wealth for long years to 
build up a huge war-machine without intending to 
use that machine. They saw, too, and tried vainly 
to make the nation see, that Germany's policy 
meant ultimately a life-and-death struggle for the 
independence not only of Great Britain but of the 
world. 

Their alarm can be easily understood. So long The reason 

n t_ j u i • v f° r alarm in 

as Germany had been supreme merely as a mill- England 
tary power, while England remained supreme as 
a naval power, there was no reason why British 
leaders should be greatly disturbed over the inter- 
national situation. But when Germany, whose 
whole nation was a trained and equipped army, 
ready for immediate action, and by far the strongest 
on the globe, began building an equally powerful 
navy, the situation changed. If she should be- 
come as strong on the sea as on the land, England 
had good reason to be deeply concerned. 

Since the establishment of the Triple Alliance in ^kabS" 8 " 
1883, British diplomats were aware of the possi- warning of 

. . . . . coming dan- 

bility of a coalition of Continental Powers, which ger 



22 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Britain's 
feuds with 
France and 
Germany 



The British 
Empire 
settles her 
differences 
with France 
and Ger- 
many 



The balance 
of power in 
Europe re- 
stored 



might try to break up the British Empire and con- 
quer England. Now they saw in this grandiose 
plan for the creation of a stupendous German navy 
an unmistakable warning. 

30. British Statesmen Decide that the Days of 
Britain's " Splendid Isolation" Must End. — The 
days of Britain's " splendid isolation" were at an 
end. She closed her long feuds with France and 
with Russia, feuds brought about by conflicting 
interests in their commercial and colonial expan- 
sions. These had been a source of secret rejoicing 
to Bismarck, and after him the Kaiser, for they 
made it easier for Germany to retain her position 
as the dictator of European diplomacy. 

31. The Formation of the Triple Entente. — That 
Germany encouraged these feuds English states- 
men and diplomats well knew; and when, in 1900, 
she adopted her ambitious naval programme, they 
recognized the grave peril. Accordingly, in 1904, 
the Entente Cordiale — or friendly understanding — 
between her and France was effected; and three 
3 r ears later a similar entente was reached with 
Russia. As France and Russia had already en- 
tered upon a formal alliance (1893), the three 
Powers were now ready to work together in 
friendly accord. The diplomatic union thus formed 
was known as the Triple Entente. 

32. The Triple Entente Restores the Balance of 
Power in Europe. — This group of states, which stood 
in hostile rivalry with the Triple Alliance — con- 



THE GREAT WAR 23 

sisting, as you remember, of Germany, Austria, 
and Italy — restored the balance of power in Europe. 
It brought great relief to both England and France 
as well as to Russia, because it meant that each 
nation was assured of support against the aggressive 
attitude of Germany. 

33. The Triple Entente Greatly Disturbs Germany. Germany 
— On the other hand, Germany was greatly dis- losjTofher 
turbed, because her relative strength was now less E^fl 6111 
than it had been before the Triple Entente came 

into being. With a restoration of the balance of 
power in Europe, she feared, with good reason, that 
she might lose her prestige; and that was for her 
a serious matter, not only from the standpoint of 
her pride, but also from that of her commercial 
and political plans. She could not give up her 
claim to be the masterful overlord of the European 
Powers because she was maturing vast schemes to 
seize not only unoccupied savage lands, but richer 
lands already appropriated, the control of which 
other Powers would contest unless she cowed them 
in advance. 

34. Germany Rapidly Develops into an Inter- The auto- 
national Bully. — She therefore became more aggres- serimpe^-" 
sive than ever before. She adopted a belligerent, SJJritof Ger- 
defiant, threatening tone, indicative of her unalter- man y 
able purpose to have her own way, however great 

might be the cost to herself and to the rest of 
Europe. She rapidly developed into an interna- 
tional bully, whose spirit was impersonated by the 



24 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



England 
blocks Ger- 
many's path- 
way to world 
domination 



England 
must give 
place to a 
young and 
vigorous 
Power 



autocratic Kaiser, swaggering about in his " shining 
armor" and ever ready to " rattle his sabre" when 
it seemed wise to threaten Europe. At last he said 
explicitly that no European decision on foreign 
questions should be made unless Germany were 
consulted and should agree to it. 

35. Treitschke's and Bernhardi's Bitter Dislike 
of England. — The attitude of Germany constantly 
grew more warlike, especially in its opposition to 
England. It was well impersonated for a genera- 
tion by Treitschke and in recent years by Bern- 
hardi — the first a brilliant professor of history in 
the University of Berlin, and the second a general 
in the German army. They bitterly disliked Eng- 
land because she was the principal obstacle block- 
ing Germany's pathway to world domination. 

According to their representation, she had been 
a robber-state, and by fraud and violence had 
seized one-fifth of the land on the globe, including 
nearly all that was fitted for civilized occupancy. 
She had no lawful claim to it, and was not worthy 
to own it, because she had not the power to use it 
in the best way. Her strength was only apparent, 
and she had the feebleness of senility tottering 
toward its grave. It was time for her to step aside 
and give place to a young and vigorous Power, 
whose people were superior in character, and whose 
civilization — or Kultur, as the Germans called it — 
was far better suited to developing and fostering 
the best interests of humanity. 



THE GREAT WAR 25 

Continuing the argument against England, her England 
Teutonic enemies said in effect: " England, the ^^ a a _ n 
international burglar, has seized immense booty, tionaibur- 
and now she says : ' I want to live in ease and com- g ar 
fort without disturbance of any kind, but with 
ample police protection. Now that I have got all 
I want, let us have universal peace. Let us have 
national disarmament and settle all international 
disagreements by arbitration.'" 

" England's attitude toward war shows that she "England 
is at the end of her career," said Treitschke and ofher Cn 
Bernhardi, supplemented by a thousand other career" 
voices: "She dares not try to make her crazy 
structure an organic whole, firmly ruled from a 
centre. Her empire is kept working only by slack 
self-interest, without loyalty or sense of duty; and 
as soon as the outlying parts find the connection a 
burden they will break away. Hence if we attack 
her, we shall have only the central island to fight, 
for all the rest — Ireland, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa — will at once secede rather 
than spend blood or money for nothing. The 
first and last are only waiting the chance to do so, 
anyway, and will help assail their hated tyrant. 

"But Germany's brilliant world career has only Germany's 
just begun; her grandeur and glory are to be real- ^o^cl- 
ized in the future. She has within herself unlimited reer just 
power, and is entitled to 'her place in the sun'; egun 
and that place she will certainly win by war, since 
she cannot acquire it in any other way, as all the 



26 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Germany's 
threatening 
attitude 



Germany's 
gains 
by war 



good districts are already pre-empted, and will not 
be given up without it." 

36. Germany's Determination to Have Full World 
Control and to Get It by Force. — This was another 
way of saying that Germany had made up her 
mind to have full world control, and to get by force 
what she was unable to acquire by diplomacy. 
The fact was that she could have had a splendid 
colonial empire for the taking, with general good- 
will, if she had ceased to threaten or aim at the 
whole. For twenty years before the war it had 
been commonly assumed in English discussion that 
Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor at least — a 
veritable garden of the earth close to Europe and 
able to support many millions of colonists — was to 
be Germany's whenever she chose to eject the 
infamous Turkish Government. 

37. The Belief in Prussianized Germany that 
" War Pays." — But Germany insisted upon her 
power to take what she wanted by force. She had 
learned from the great Prussian, Bismarck, from 
the successful war career of the house of Hohen- 
zollern, and from the remarkable history of the 
Prussian state, that "war pays." Long before 
this time a distinguished Frenchman, Mirabeau, 
had pithily and truly remarked: "War is the na- 
tional industry of Prussia," and under William II 
it had greatly increased its proportions. The argu- 
ment was advanced that Germany made a profit of 
2,000 per cent by the Franco-Prussian War in 1871; 



THE GREAT WAR 27 

and that she could make a profit of 20,000 per cent 
by the war which was to be brought on in the second 
decade of the twentieth century. It was to this 
end that she had developed the best trained and 
most powerful army in the world, and, as already 
observed, was rapidly building up a great navy. It 
was the spirit and method of Bismarck still alive 
and evolving its natural growth in the German na- 
tion, even though differing in detail and going be- 
yond what he thought advantageous. Germany 
had become Prussianized. 

38. Germany Resolutely Opposes Disarmament. — Germany 
With this view-point of Germany before us, we need armament 8 " 
not be surprised that she resolutely opposed the dis- 
cussion of disarmament at the first international 
peace conference held at The Hague in 1899. Her 
delegates to that conference declared in boastful 
language that "armaments are not a burden but a 
privilege," and that Germany would increase her 
expenditures for that purpose. 

Andrew D. White, one of the American delegates German op- 
to the conference, when referring to the attitude Arbitration 
taken at that' time by the chairman of the German 
delegation, said: "Meeting Count Minister, who, 
after M. de Staal, is very generally considered the 
most important personage here, we discussed the 
subject of arbitration. To my regret, I found him 
entirely opposed to any well-developed plan. . . . 
He insisted that arbitration must be injurious to 
Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no 



28 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



The Kaiser 
against the 
discussion 
of disarma- 
ment 



Bethmann- 
Hollweg 
says Ger- 
many needs 
an increase 
of arma- 
ments 



other country can be; that she can mobilize her army 
in ten days; and that neither France, England, 
Russia, nor any other Power can do this. 'Arbitra- 
tion/ he said, 'would simply give rival Powers time 
to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore 
be a great disadvantage to Germany.'" 

On the near approach of the second international 
peace conference (1909), the Kaiser declared to 
King Edward of England, with emphasis: "I will 
go to war rather than allow the question of dis- 
armament to be discussed." 

Two years later — and only three years before 
the outbreak of the Great War — Chancellor von 
Bethmann-Hollweg spoke in the Reichstag as fol- 
lows: "Any agitation in Germany in favor of dis- 
armament is absolutely unpardonable. . . . Ger- 
many is, among all the Powers, the only one which 
possesses not only sufficient men, but sufficient gold, 
to increase armaments on land and sea to an extraor- 
dinary degree. Germany is at the same time the 
nation that needs this increase of armaments the 
most. We stand not at the end, but at the be- 
ginning of a great development." 

39. Bernhardi's Belief that Arbitration Would not 
be a Good Thing for Germany. — Again, in 1911, 
Bernhardi, in his "Germany and the Next War," 
declared: "Arbitration may easily conflict with the 
actual turn of affairs, and may check the expan- 
sion of any young and vigorous state in favor of one 
which is sinking in the scale of civilization." It 



THE GREAT WAR 29 

is very evident that he had in mind Germany, as 
the " young and vigorous state/' and either Eng- 
land or France, or very likely both, as " sinking in 
the scale of civilization." 

40. To Secure Economic and Political Supremacy Germany 
Germany Prepares for War. — These several quota- ^ht^f 
tions from German leaders of thought and national might 
policy point to one important fact : That Germany 

was preparing for war in which she expected to 
secure the economic and political supremacy which, 
as she claimed, it was the right of might to make 
her own. 

As a further example of this belligerent attitude France to be 
toward her neighbors, here is another quotation crushed 
from Bernhardi's " Germany and the Next War": 
"We must square our account with France if we 
wish for a free hand in our international policy. 
This is the first and foremost condition of a sound 
German policy; and since the hostility of France 
cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the mat- 
ter must be settled by force of arms. France must 
be so completely crushed that she can never again 
come across our path." 

41. England the Most Formidable Enemy of Ger- England to 
many. — But while Germany hated France and was be destr °y ed 
determined in due time to " square her account" 

with that country, it was England that caused her 
most serious concern. For England, with her 
vast colonial empire, and her mighty fleet which 
gave her supremacy of the seas — England, with her 



30 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



France in- 
dependent 
of Ger- 
many 



Change in 
the face of 
European 
politics 



commerce that embraced the world and her enor- 
mous wealth — was Germany's most formidable en- 
emy. Accordingly; England must be destroyed 
before Germany could realize her ambitious scheme 
of world domination. 

42. England, in Giving up Her Policy of " Splendid 
Isolation," Boldly Opposes the Teutonic Avalanche. — 
But when England departed from her policy of 
"splendid isolation" by forming alliances with 
France and Russia, it became clear to the Kaiser 
and his officials at Berlin that a diplomatic 
revolution had been brought about in Europe, 
and the government at Berlin well knew, though 
the English populace still did not, that she was 
taking a bold stand in opposition to Germany. 
For protected by the powerful support of England, 
France ceased longer to yield to the open or 
covert dictation of Berlin, and assumed a position 
of independence in her policy of expansion, espe- 
cially in relation to Morocco and the western Medi- 
terranean. 

With this group of powerful states ready to 
work in cordial co-operation to foil Germany's ag- 
gressive schemes of expansion and Pan-Germanism, 
the face of European politics had again changed. 
Germany saw that her days of preponderant in- 
fluence were coming to an end, and that she should 
soon have to fight for what she should get in 
place of merely threatening to fight. 



THE GREAT WAR 31 

43. The Antagonism of Germany to England 
Grows into Bitter Hatred. — But hoping to keep 
her prestige unchallenged a little longer, she be^ 
came more and more overbearing and domineering. 
Her antagonism to England grew into a hatred, ever 
deepening in acrimony, until she gripped her foe in 
deadly combat on the battle-field and on the sea, 
and forced her to defend herself from extinction. 
But until the war was raging in long-forgotten 
savagery and bestiality at their very gates, Eng- 
land's best classes would not accept the truth. 



CHAPTER V 
PAN-GERMANISM AND ITS DAZZLING VISION 

44. Bismarck and William I Indifferent About a Work 

Navy and the Acquisition of Colonies.— Under Wil- enough for 
J _ # Germany at 

liam II the policy for world empire made great home and 
strides. Both Bismarck and his master ; William I, in Eur °P e 
as already mentioned; were indifferent about a 
navy and the acquisition of colonies. They thought 
there was work enough for Germany to do in solv- 
ing her internal problems and in holding diplomatic 
sway on the Continent. To them it seemed im- 
portant not to arouse the suspicion and jealousy of 
Great Britain by inaugurating a far-reaching policy 
of appropriating territory. Not long after the 
formation of the German Empire, Bismarck had 



32 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



German 
possessions 
outside of 
Europe 



declared — with sincerity, no doubt — that the whole 
of the Balkans was not worth the bones of a single 
Pomeranian grenadier. 

45. Germany Competes with Other European Coun- 
tries in a Wild Scramble for Territory in Foreign Lands. 
— It was during the eighties that Germany was 
seized by the consuming desire for colonial posses- 
sions which was then sweeping over Europe. She 
began to compete, with other European Powers, in 
a wild scramble for territory in foreign lands, in 
the great movement of expansion. Nationalism was 
developing into imperialism. Even as late as 1884 
she had no possessions outside of Europe; but before 
the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, she owned 
in Africa an immense area of nearly a million square 
miles, mainly on the Guinea coast and in the south- 
east and southwest. However, it was without 
much economic value, and was unsuitable for plant- 
ing colonies of German people. More valuable 
were several groups of islands she possessed in the 
western Pacific, and a " sphere of influence," or 
region of control, she had obtained at Kiauchau in 
China. 

46. The Colonial Possessions of Germany not of 
High Value. — These possessions had been acquired 
mostly by diplomatic methods made effective by 
the possibility of war; but except Kiauchau, they 
were not on the whole of high value, because most 
of the land best suited for Germany's purposes was 
already under the control of other Powers, who 



THE GREAT WAR 33 

had ventured into the field of territorial expansion 
a long time in advance of her. 

47. War, According to Bernhardi, an Economic Germany 
and Political Necessity for Germany. — The problem ^f^ " 
became all-absorbing. The point of view of many the coming 
German leaders at that time was no secret. It was genera 10ns 
openly expressed by Bernhardi in his "Germany 
and the Next War/' where he defends Germany's 
policy by amplifying her needs: 

"No remunerative occupation will ever be found 
within the borders of the existing German Empire 
for the whole population however favorable our 
international relations. We shall soon, therefore, 
be faced by the question whether we wish to sur- 
render the coming generations to foreign countries, 
as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we 
wish to take steps to find them a home in our Ger- 
man colonies, and so retain them for the Father- 
land. There is no possible doubt how this question 
must be answered. 

" Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, The right 
new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the ° conquest 
cost of its possessors — that is, by conquest — which 
thus becomes the law of necessity. The right of 
conquest is universally acknowledged. 

"It may be that a growing people cannot win Territory 
colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the state ^^ired 
wishes to retain the surplus population which the by war 
mother country cannot feed. Thus the only course 
left is to acquire territory by war" [with other 



34 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



What the 
future of 
Germany 
depends 
upon 



German 
emigration 



civilized powers]. " Thus the interest of self-preser- 
vation leads inevitably to war and the conquest of 
foreign soil." 

48. Bernhardi Declares War to be a Moral Ne- 
cessity also. — According to this representative of 
mediaeval militarism; war is seen to be an economic 
and a political necessity. Bernhardi then goes on: 
"War is also a moral necessity; if waged to pro- 
tect the highest and most valuable interests of a 
nation. As human life is now constituted; it is 
political idealism which calls for war." 

49. BernhardPs Belief in the Great Value of 
Colonies to Germany. — Having thus demonstrated 
Germany's need of colonies and justified the method 
of securing them by force, he goes on to discuss the 
future importance of colonies to Germany. The 
facts upon which his arguments are based are 
easily followed. Elsewhere he says: "We have 
long underestimated the value of colonies. In 
the future the importance of Germany depends 
upon two points: (1) How many millions of men 
in the world speak German; and (2) how many 
of them are politically members of the German 
Empire." 

How did Bernhardi's argument tally with the 
facts? In the early part of this century, the Ger- 
man population was increasing with startling ra- 
pidity; about a million souls a year. By the enor- 
mous extension of her economic power, Germany 
had not only been feeding and otherwise supporting 



THE GREAT WAR 35 

her population ; but she had cut down to a minimum 
the number of her emigrants to foreign lands. In 
1885 it had been reduced to about 171,000, while 
in 1898 it was only about 23,000. She had been 
following this policy of restricting emigration, be- 
cause she could provide means to support her 
population at home. 

But for many years before she became an in- 
dustrial country — that is, before 1871 — she had 
lost millions of her people, among whom were the 
most energetic and valuable of her citizenship. 
They had gone to the United States, Canada, 
South America, and other lands, where they were 
not only lost to the Fatherland, but added to the 
economic and military power of their adopted coun- 
try. And although emigration dwindled in the 
later years of the last century, with the enormous 
yearly increase of the people in the early years of 
the present century, it was evident that the loss by 
emigration must soon begin again on a large scale. 

To this transfer of economic and military 
strength from herself to what might prove to be 
deadly enemies, Germany strenuously objected. 
How could she put a stop to this loss of power? 
In two ways only: The first was by acquiring 
possession of colonies; the second, by establishing 
" spheres of influence," or regions of control in 
weaker countries. But in view of the pre-emption 
by other nations of most of the best land for such 
purposes, the first method could be carried out in 



36 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



" England 
effete and 
decadent " 



" The whole 
world will 
be Ger- 
many," said 
Heine 



just one way, and that was by the use of military 
and naval power. 

As we might expect; therefore, early in the 
twentieth century, there was a growing demand 
on the part of many influential Germans — a point 
of view soon to be taken by a large majority of 
people in Prussianized Germany — that the desired 
colonies should be secured by war, if they could 
be secured in no other way. 

50. Reason for the Bitter Hostility of the German 
People to England. — In carrying out this purpose 
Germany knew that the greatest obstacle she would 
have to meet was the British Empire. Hence 
the bitter hostility of the German people to Eng- 
land. They verily believed, as did Treitschke and 
Bernhardi, that England had grown effete and de- 
cadent; and that her glory had departed, while 
the virile young Germany was confidently looking 
forward to a splendid and glorious future. The 
conclusion was irresistible: England must give 
place to a nation admirably qualified to guide the 
world into a higher and better civilization than 
humanity had ever known. Germany's God-given 
mission was to extend her Kultur throughout the 
world. 

51. Teutonic Belief in Germany's Divine Mission. 
—For a full century this belief in Germany's divine 
mission had been growing stronger in the Teutonic 
mind. "Not merely Alsace and Lorraine," the 
poet Heine had written before the middle of the 



THE GREAT WAR 37 

nineteenth century, with all the weight his prestige 
could give his significant words ; "not merely 
Alsace and Lorraine, but all France, Europe, and 
the whole world will be ours. Yes, the whole 
world will be Germany." Only ten years or so 
before the outbreak of the Great War, Emperor 
William himself had declared at Bremen: "God 
has called us to civilize the world; we are mission- 
aries of progress." The pulpits teemed with such 
sayings, and some far more extravagant than these, 
comparing the Germans to the ancient Israelites, 
and all other nations to the Canaanites, whom the 
chosen of God were to enslave or slaughter at will. . 

52. Bulk of Educated Germans in 1914 Regard the The one 
Rest of the World with Contempt.— In fact, it is ^°f essive 
not too much to say that the bulk of educated 
Germans in 1914 regarded the rest of the world 
with arrogant contempt, and scoffed at any moral 
obligation to refrain from war whenever the time 
was opportune. They listened admiringly to 
preachers and other speakers by the thousand, who 
told them it was God's will that the backward races 
like the English and the French, the Italians and 
the Russians, should give place to the one pro- 
gressive race. 

With such lofty conception of their own superior The Ger- 
worth, and with absolute confidence in the unlimited ™ a ^navy 7 
strength of their Fatherland, many leaders of Ger- 
man thought, in the early part of the twentieth 
century, urged that the most important task of 



38 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Germany 
steeped in 
crass ma- 
terialism 



The Kaiser 
visits the 
Sultan 



the Imperial Government was to make the army 
and the navy so powerful that Germany could win 
certain victory at any time that might seem most 
opportune for beginning an international struggle. 

53. Pan- Germanism a System of International 
Robbery. — Many of the war-mad militarists were 
enthusiastic adherents of Pan-Germanism , the 
unblushing and shameful purpose of which was to 
annex to the empire by force of arms whatever re- 
gions might seem useful for increasing the power of 
the Hohenzollerns. As some one has rightly said, 
Pan-Germanism was nothing less than a system of 
international robbery. The Pan-Germanists were 
economic brigands. 

54. Pan-Germanism Labors Earnestly to Bring 
About War. — By 1908 Pan-Germanism had a wide 
influence in the Fatherland; and by 1911 its momen- 
tum had become tremendous. It made a strong 
appeal to Germany, now steeped in crass material- 
ism; and its watchword, which continued to grow 
in vehemence year by year, was: "Let us have 
not merely a greater Germany, but a world-ruling 
Germany, as the one means of establishing a nation 
which other peoples will steadily enrich." For this 
end, Pan-Germanism labored earnestly to bring 
about war. 

55. The Kaiser's Strong Desire for the Friendship 
and Favor of the Sultan. — Turning now to Ger- 
many's second method of finding support for her 
teeming population — that of commercial penetra- 



• THE GREAT WAR 39 

tion — we find that Emperor William, early in his 
reign , turned his covetous eyes toward the Turkish 
Empire. In 1889, the second year of his reign, he 
went to Constantinople; and again he paid a more 
friendly and formal visit to the Sultan in the Turk- 
ish capital in 1898, his strong desire being to 
secure the friendship and favor of the Sultan, for 
reasons which can be stated in a few words. 

Germany, as you know, was in search of markets Markets for 
in which to buy the raw materials needed by ^eTSsh 
her industries and in which to sell her finished Empire 
goods, and those of the Turkish Empire seemed to 
be admirably suited to her purposes. The wide 
valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, in Meso- 
potamia, had a very fertile soil, and could be made 
highly productive by irrigation, for which there 
was an abundant water-supply. Two of the prod- 
ucts of that region — rice and cotton — were greatly 
needed in Germany. Asia Minor, too, was rich in 
mineral resources, and could be made to yield 
largely in cereals, including wheat. As both Asia 
Minor and Mesopotamia were inhabited mostly 
by uncivilized people, these regions were undevel- 
oped and their resources were largely untouched. 
Here were lands which Germany's commercial 
rivals had not yet penetrated; and if Germany 
could secure economic control of them, they would 
in the course of time furnish reservoirs for millions 
of her surplus population, as well as markets for 
large supplies of her raw materials and her finished 



40 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



A rich field 
for Ger- 
many's 
economic 
enterprise 



A strong 
strategic 
position 



goods. Here indeed was a rich field for Germany's 
economic enterprise; a wonderful opportunity for 
inaugurating and working out the ambitious 
schemes of the Pan-German propagandists. 

56. The " Berlin to Bagdad " Railroad. — As a first 
step toward the economic control of Mesopotamia 
and a German protectorate over Turkey, the Bag- 
dad Railroad concession was secured by German 
capitalists early in the twentieth century. By 
way of Vienna, Sofia, the Balkan countries, and 
Constantinople, the road would connect Berlin and 
Bagdad, and was therefore called the " Berlin to 
Bagdad" Railroad. The extension of the line to 
Hamburg on the north and to the Persian Gulf on 
the south would complete what is known as the 
" Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme. 

57. How Political Control of Turkey by Germany 
Would Threaten the British Empire. — This railroad 
has well been called the backbone of the Pan-Ger- 
man plan to secure economic, and later, political, 
control of the Turkish Empire. Should the plan 
succeed, Germany would be in a very strong strategic 
position; for she could attack England at a most 
vital point of her empire, the Suez Canal and 
Egypt. She could also, choosing her own time, 
make an attack upon India; and when she should 
extend the railway line to the Persian Gulf, as 
planned, she could establish a naval base there, and 
support an invasion of India by attacks upon the 
English fleet and transports that would be going 
to its defense or supply. 



THE GREAT WAR 



41 



58. The Kaiser's Deep-Seated Desire to Win the The Kaiser 
Favor of the Moslem Population. — It was at Damas- Moslems 
cus, in November, 1898, that the Kaiser revealed 







JairoW k Cana k \ 



MAP SHOWING THE BERLIN TO BAGDAD RAILROAD 



his deep-seated desire to win the favor of the Mos- 
lems, wherever they might dwell. "May his 
Majesty the Sultan," he said, "as well as the 
three hundred millions of Moslems who venerate 
him as their khalifa, rest assured that the German 



42 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

emperor is their friend forever." These famous 
words indicate clearly enough now, in the light of 
what we have learned about Pan-German plans, 
that William II hoped to reinforce Germany's mili- 
tary power by making use of the three hundred 
million Mohammedans as a menace to her enemies. 
59. Relation Between the Two Railroads and the 
Ambition of Germany to Control the World. —For 
economic, political, and strategic reasons, there- 
fore, the success of the "Berlin to Bagdad" scheme 
and the larger " Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 
scheme were of vital importance to Germany, be- 
cause they furnished the means by which she hoped 
to control the Balkan region and the Turkish Em- 
pire, and later to dominate and enslave the world. 
" World It was this dazzling vision which urged the 

dowSaii" Kaiser and his satellites to commit themselves to 
the policy of "world power or downfall." As we 
know now, the fates had decreed that it should be 
downfall, for in the titanic struggle which the Im- 
perial German Government was resolved to pre- 
cipitate in order to realize its greedy ambition, 
Kaiserism and Pan-Germanism received their death- 
blow at the hands of an indignant and outraged 
civilization, which was determined "to make the 
world safe for democracy." 



THE GREAT WAR 43 



CHAPTER VI 

HOW THE BALKAN WARS MENACED PAN- 
GERMANISM 

60. German Control of the " Berlin to Bagdad " 
Railway Entire Imperative. — The Pan-German 
scheme of obtaining economic control of Mesopo- 
tamia and Asia Minor could not be carried out suc- 
cessfully unless the " Berlin to Bagdad" Railway 
entire were administered by Germany ; any broken 
connection would imperil the whole line. Accord- 
ingly, it was imperative that Germany should secure 
and maintain not only economic but also political 
dominance over those Balkan countries through 
which the railroad ran. 

61. The Balkan Peninsula a Storm Centre. — This The control 
fact alone made the Balkan situation one of the tlf^S™ 

Kan region 

first magnitude; and its control by the two Teutonic of the first 
Powers became a cardinal principle in their policies impor ance 
of commercial and political expansion. The situa- 
tion reveals one of several reasons why the Balkan 
Peninsula became a storm centre for European rival- 
ries; ambitions, and deep-seated enmities of long 
standing; other reasons will be made clear as our 
story develops. 

62. Morocco a Distinctive Menace to the Peace of The size 
Europe. — A less serious but yet a distinctive menace JJ£ j^^, 
to the peace of Europe was bound up in Morocco. 

The situation here could not be ignored. Close to 



44 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

Europe, it had almost exactly the area of France, 
with a thousand miles of seacoast extending along 
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It was 
rich in minerals and in possible tropical products, 
and had long attracted the eyes of Europe; for its 
wild peoples and futile Moslem government made 
an independent future for it impossible, at least 
for centuries. It was proper that some civilized 
Christian state should train its people and develop 
its resources. On racial, historic, and geographic 
grounds Spain should have undertaken this re- 
sponsibility, but she was too poor and not strong 
enough as a political Power to become its ruler. 
Border 63. To France Falls the Task of Modernizing 

Morocco. — France had remade its eastern neighbor, 
Algeria, where the native tribes were the same as in 
Morocco. The friction occasioned by the contact 
of these tribes with each other brought about con- 
stant border troubles for France. To her, there- 
fore, by the course of events, fell the task of modern- 
izing Morocco. And when in 1905 anarchy among 
the tribes forced France to interfere, Germany, 
who had almost no trade there, and openly admitted 
the fact, conceded the French claim of paramount 
interests in the land. 

64. A Menacing Crisis in Morocco in 191 1. — But 
the Pan-Germans bitterly opposed this view, for 
in their colonial dream they had greedily appro- 
priated Morocco as their own. It is not surpris- 
ing, therefore, that when opportunity offered in 



troubles 
in Morocco 



THE GREAT WAR 45 

1911, they brought on so menacing a crisis in Mo- 
rocco that all Europe, with the exception of the 
British people, believed that war was near. But 
the Kaiser, not yet insistent to the point of war, 
gave way and thus lost prestige in the diplo- 
matic struggle. 

65. Two Serious Crises in the Balkans. — More 
serious than these two crises in Morocco were two 
others in the Balkans. They grew out of the resolve 
of Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, to have 
absolute control of the Balkan Peninsula, as a vital 
link of the great Eastern railroad scheme, and the 
equally stubborn resolve of Russia that they should 
not have such control, since it would cut her off from 
her water route to the Mediterranean. The first 
of these crises was in 1908, the second in 1914. 

66. Germany the Central Figure in All Four of the Germany 
Crises. — In all four of the crises which we have ^^^ 

supremacy 

mentioned — and these came at three-year intervals, 
in 1905, 1908, 1911, and 1914— Germany was the 
dominating figure, inexorably determined to assert 
her supremacy in the diplomatic field. And this was 
not mere idle arrogance, for, inflated by her great 
victories, and convinced of her cultural superiority, 
she believed that by this means she might gain her 
colonial and political ends without actual warfare. 

67. The Balkan Countries. — Turning our atten- Turkey's 
tion to the Balkan region, where Germany could not ^reSive 
allow her ally, Austria, to yield a foot without giv- rule 

ing up her whole scheme, let us examine briefly 



46 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
under rule 
of Austria- 
Hungary 



Austria- 
Hungary 
desires po- 
litical con- 
trol of 
Serbia 



the local conditions. The principal Balkan coun- 
tries were Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Ru- 
mania, all Christian countries which, by the early- 
years of the twentieth century, had become inde- 
pendent of Turkey, under whose cruel and op- 
pressive rule they had suffered for centuries. Other 
countries — not yet independent — were Bosnia-Her- 
zegovina, inhabited by Serbians; Albania, by Al- 
banians; and Macedonia, by Serbians, Greeks, and 
Bulgarians, partly in separate districts and partly 
mixed. 

68. The People in Bosnia and Herzegovina Desire 
Union with their Brethren in Serbia. — Since the 
Berlin Congress in 1878, following the war between 
Turkey and Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
been part of the Turkish Empire only in name. They 
were actually ruled by Austria-Hungary, but they 
hated their rulers as foreigners and drillmasters and 
desired union with the people of their own language 
and customs in Serbia. And the dream of the Serbs 
for centuries had been to revive a Greater Serbia. 

69. The Extension of the Organization and Power 
of Serbia very Distasteful to Austria-Hungary. — Such 
an extension of the national organization and power 
of Serbia was very distasteful to Austria-Hungary, 
for it seriously interfered with the ambitious plans 
of Austro-Hungarian diplomats and statesmen. 
They wished for such political control of Serbia as 
the Dual Monarchy had exercised from 1878 to 
1903. During that period the Serbian ruler, King 




from a photograph, copyright by Underwood and Underwood 
THE MARKET SQUARE, SPARTA 



48 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

Alexander, had been pro-Austrian in sympathies; 

but at the end of the period he was murdered and 

in his place a pro-Russian ruler ascended the Serbian 

throne. 

Russia de- 70. Russia Supports Serbia for Racial and Eco- 

sires a nomic Reasons. — From that time Serbia was a pro- 

trade out- . x 

let to the sea tege of Russia, the great Slavic Power to whom 

this smaller Slavic state looked for backing and 
protection. Such support Russia was more than 
willing to give not only for racial but also for eco- 
nomic reasons. She had no satisfactory trade out- 
let to the sea, and as most of her exports reached 
foreign lands by going through the Dardanelles, 
she had long desired to get control of Constan- 
tinople, which commanded these famous straits. 
Failing in this, she might well desire, through 
Serbia, to extend her influence over the Balkan 
Peninsula as far as some seaport on the iEgean 
Sea or the Adriatic. 
Austrian /i. Why Austria-Hungary Formally Annexed Bos- 

fears of nia an( j Herzegovina. — It was fear of the Slavic 

rivalry influence of Serbia, and far more of Serbia's pow- 

erful protector, Russia, which had led to Austria- 
Hungary 's desire for the administrative control of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which she exercised after 
1878. Up to 1908 she had been content with such 
control, but as international rivalries increased 
in the early years of the twentieth century, and as 
in Austria fears of Slavic rivalry in the Balkan 
Peninsula became more intense, that country 



THE GREAT WAR 49 

resolved to tighten her grasp. Therefore, in that 
year ; in flagrant defiance of the international agree- 
ment reached by the European Powers at the Berlin 
Congress in 1878, and without warning to the 
other nations, she took complete control of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by formally annexing them. 

This was a serious blow to Russian ambition. A serious 
That country had failed through her defeat bv £ low . to 

J m ° J Russian 

Japan in her ambitious scheme to establish ambition 
her empire on the Pacific. She had turned 
then, as we have noted, to find an outlet for her 
trade through Constantinople, or else on the iEgean 
or the Adriatic. But if Austria-Hungary should 
dominate the Balkan Peninsula, the desires of Rus- 
sia in that field could never be realized. 

72. Russia Makes a Vigorous Protest. — Russia 
therefore made a vigorous protest against the an- 
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- 
Hungary. She called for another European con- 
gress, similar to that held in Berlin in 1878, to go 
over the whole complex situation in the Balkan 
Peninsula. But Austria-Hungary refused to meet 
with such a congress, and Germany stood by her. 

73. Edward VII Indignant at the Outrageous Austria- 
Conduct of Austria-Hungary.— The English king, £™g^ n 
Edward VII, and the British Government were in- intema- 
dignant because of the outrageous conduct of Aus- ag^ement 
tria-Hungary in coolly breaking an international 
agreement. It made clear the fact that the Teu- 
tonic Powers had definitely resolved on force to ac- 



50 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Dramatic 
words of 
the Kaiser 



A triumph 
for Austro- 
Hungarian 
and German 
prestige 



Two objects 
of the 
Balkan 
alliance 



complish their Eastern plans; but English public 
opinion would not support a war upon an issue 
having no immediate bearing upon British interests. 

74. Germany Gives Strong Support to Her Ally. — 
The ruling classes in Russia were deeply sympa- 
thetic with the Serbian people and the Russian 
Government gave signs of encouraging Serbia to go 
to war. Then the Kaiser, in a highly dramatic fash- 
ion, exclaimed that if his august ally Austria were 
compelled to draw the sword, "a Knight in shining 
armor " — that is, armed Germany — would be found 
at her side. As Russia was not ready for war, she 
had to yield to German bluff and retire in deep 
humiliation. 

Serbia, inflamed with anger and indignation, was 
eager for war. But it would of course have been 
foolhardy for her to engage in deadly combat with 
a military power of many times her own strength. 

75. Direct Bearing of the Annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina upon the Great War. — The out- 
come of the crisis was a triumph for Austro-Hun- 
garian and German prestige, and the Teutonic 
Powers were content. But the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in defiance of honor and 
right and justice, had a direct bearing upon a con- 
flict far more destructive and disastrous than Eu- 
rope had ever known, as the future was to reveal. 

76. Macedonia Another Trouble-Breeder. — An- 
other trouble-breeder was Macedonia. In this 
Turkish province were people of three nationalities, 



THE GREAT WAR 51 

Serbians ; Greeks, and Bulgarians, all of whom 
suffered from the harsh misrule of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Turkish Government forced upon 
them unjust laws and exacted from them extortion- 
ate and sometimes ruinous taxes. At last the 
Turkish yoke became so intolerable that Serbia, 
Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria formed an alli- 
ance with two objects in view: (1) To free the 
Christians in Macedonia from Turkey and take 
them under their own rule; and (2) to drive the 
Turks out of Europe. 

77. The First Balkan War (1912). — They chose Why the 
1912 for the attack, partly because the Turkish ^^" I2 
army was being reorganized by German officers and 
was still in a somewhat chaotic state, and partly 
because Turkey was distracted by the Turco- 
Italian War in which she was embroiled. 

But despite Turkey's weakness at that time, the Confidence 
Teutonic Powers, supported by the advice of their ^^Powers 
military experts, confidently believed that the in the Turk- 
Turkish armies, under a single command, led by 1S anmes 
German officers, and equipped from the Krupp 
factories with the latest German guns, would crush 
the petty Balkan armies, under four separate com- 
mands, each dreading another's success almost 
more than their joint failure. But in this Germany 
and Austria-Hungary were grievously mistaken; 
for the allied countries were at all points so sur- 
prisingly successful that within the brief space of 
a single month they had practically demolished the 



52 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Austria- 
Hungary 
supported 
by Germany 
and Italy 



Turkish Empire in Europe so that Turkey was al- 
most driven out of that continent. 

78. Why the Teutonic Powers Oppose a Federation 
of Balkan States. — If the Balkan states had been 
able to work together in as much harmony after the 
fighting ended as during the struggle itself, they 
might have formed a strong federation of states, 
as many liberal statesmen in Europe hoped they 
would do. But such a federation would have been 
fatal to the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence 
in the Balkan Peninsula and to the working out of 
the Pan-German plan in Mesopotamia and Asia 
Minor. Therefore, the Teutonic Powers opposed it, 
and Austria encouraged the bitter dissension that 
had sprung up among the allies about the division 
of the spoils of war. 

79. Austria-Hungary Succeeds in Her Plan of 
Having Albania Made an Independent State. — Aus- 
tria was very astute and effective in her methods of 
procedure. She knew that one of the strongest 
reasons why Serbia had taken up arms was to 
secure territory in Albania with a seaport on the 
Adriatic, and that, the Serbian armies having won 
this greatly coveted territory, that country was 
about to secure the great prize for which she 
longed. 

But Austria-Hungary insisted that Albania must 
be made an independent state, and, mobilizing her 
armies, ordered the withdrawal of Serbian troops 
from that region. In so doing, she was again 



THE GREAT WAR 53 

backed by Germany. She had the support of Italy, 
also, for Albania guarded the approach by sea to the 
Adriatic and therefore possessed great strategic 
value to both nations. Either of them, therefore, 
would profit greatly by securing its control, and the 
ambitions of both would be seriously balked if 
Serbia should add it to her territory. Austria- 
Hungary had her way. Albania was allowed to 
set up a government of her own. 

80. Bitter Trouble Among the Balkan States. — Claims of 
A self-governing Albania meant not only a disas- Q^ece and 
trous defeat to Serbia in realizing her cherished Bulgaria 
dream, but it was also the cause of bitter trouble 
among the allies — Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. 
For in the various treaties which they had made 
with one another in the spring and summer of 1912, 
before joining in an attack upon Turkish armies and 
Turkish territory, they had agreed to make allot- 
ments of conquered territory at the end of the 
struggle in the event of their being victorious. 
According to these pacts, Serbia was to get as her 
share much of the territory of Albania; Greece 
was to have part of southern Albania, including a 
commercial outlet on the Adriatic Sea; and Bul- 
garia was to have as her share the largest part of 
Macedonia, with a seaport on the ^Egean. 

Serbia, seeing her share snatched from her and Serbia's 
bitterly disappointed that she could not have her appomtment 
Adriatic port, demanded that Bulgaria give her part 
of Macedonia to make up for her loss. Greece 



54 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Bulgaria 
strongly op- 
poses Ser- 
bia and 
Greece 



The Teu- 
tonic Powers 
encourage 
Bulgaria to 
fight 



Bulgaria 

hopelessly 

beaten 



backed her, and also put in a claim of her own 
for Macedonian territory. 

Bulgaria strongly opposed both countries, de- 
claring that she must have for herself what her 
armies had conquered, and asserting with much 
emphasis that the main reason why the Bulgarians 
had rushed to arms was that they might rescue from 
Turkish misrule the lands of her "unredeemed " 
people and bring them under her flag. She did 
not wish now to give up to any other nation part of 
the fruits of her victory. 

81. The Second Balkan War (1913). — Here again 
was a fine opportunity for mischief-making on the 
part of the Teutonic Powers. They not only 
wished for serious trouble among the Balkan coun- 
tries, but they also felt confident that their friend, 
Bulgaria, would be a sure winner if war should 
come. So they encouraged Bulgaria to fight. Her 
generals and officers were more than willing to 
listen to such appeals, for they felt confident of 
success. Believing in their unquestioned superior- 
ity to the Serbian and Greek armies, they would 
neither debate the situation nor wait, and were 
either insolent or condescending, according to their 
mood, toward their former allies. 

The war began on the night of June 29, 1913, 
when the Bulgarian army made a treacherous at- 
tack along the whole line of the Serbian and Greek 
armies, with the hope of crushing them by one 
terrific, sudden blow. But in this they totally 



56 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Losses and 
gains of the 
warring 
countries 



failed. At the end of a month, Bulgaria was hope- 
lessly beaten and was at the mercy of her enemies, 
to the list of which had been added Rumania and 
Turkey; for, taking advantage of Bulgaria's dis- 
traction, Rumania had attacked her from the 
north on account of conflicting claims of territory, 
and Turkey, with a reorganized army, had recap- 
tured Adrianople, a city which the Bulgarians had 
taken in the First Balkan War. 

82. Striking Results of the Two Balkan Wars. — 
The results of the two Balkan Wars were far-reach- 
ing. Turkey lost most of her European territory, 
which had been reduced from 65,300 square miles 
with 6,130,000 people, to 10,880 square miles with 
about 1,900,000 people. Rumania had forced Bul- 
garia to yield to her 2,687 square miles with 
286,000 people. Serbia had added to her territory 
some 15,000 square miles with about 1,700,000 
inhabitants, and thereby almost doubled her area. 
Greece had gained nearly 18,000 square miles of 
territory — including Crete and many other islands 
— in all about three-fourths of her original area 
with about 1,700,000 people. Bulgaria, humiliated 
and crestfallen, had been driven out of much of 
Macedonia, and although she had made a net gain 
of 9,660 square miles of territory, with 125,500 
people, it was of little value. 

83. The Balkan Wars Bring Keen Disappointment 
to Germany and Austria-Hungary. — These two Bal- 
kan wars brought keen disappointment to Germany 



THE GREAT WAR 



57 



and Austria-Hungary. Germany had lost in mili- 
tary prestige, because the Turkish armies, after 



BALKAN STATES 
1913 




& 



• tfazaaV 



S E A 



being trained by German officers, had suffered 
grievous defeat wherever they fought. Both Ger- 
many and Austria had lost in diplomatic prestige 
because they had incited Bulgaria to war and that 



58 



THE" CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Attitude of 
Bulgaria and 
Turkey 
toward Ger- 
many and 
Austria- 
Hungary 



country had been ignominiously defeated on the* 
battle-field. 

84. The Outcome of the Balkan Wars a Distinct 
Threat to Pan-Germanism. — But even worse than 
the defeat of Turkey and Bulgaria, in affecting the 
ambitious schemes of Austria-Hungary and Pan- 
Germanism, was the change of attitude on the part 
of these nations toward Germany. Bulgaria was 
bitter over the results of the war and sullen toward 
Germany and Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, 
because both of them had advised her to enter upon 
the Second Balkan War; while Turkey, having fought 
her losing battles without support from her Teu- 
tonic friends, was openly turning a cold shoulder to 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and leaning more 
and more to the Entente Powers. 



CHAPTER VII 

WHY GERMANY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
WISHED TO CRUSH SERBIA 



Serbian 
longings for 
a Greater 
Serbia 



85. Serbia at the End of the Balkan Wars much 
more Powerful than Before. — The blow, struck in the 
Balkans, which fell so heavily upon Pan-Germanism, 
brought a menace that was greatly disturbing to 
William II and his advisers at Berlin, for not 
only had Bulgaria been .defeated, but Serbia 
was much more powerful than ever before. She 



THE GREAT WAR 59 

had increased her military prestige, had added a vast 
extent of territory in Macedonia and thereby had 
gained larger influence over her kinsmen, the Jugo- 
slavs in Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and 
even in Austria-Hungary. Moreover, this great 
accretion of power intensified the Serbian longings 
for a Greater Serbia, which should extend her na- 
tional organization so as to include under one flag 
millions of the Jugo-Slav race, with Serbia as a 
centre. It was a worthy aspiration for a brave and 
heroic people. 

86. The Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary. — In 1913 Serbia's in- 
the situation in the Balkans, therefore, had be- JJJjJ^ ™~ eT 
come far more delicate and perilous in its rela- thejugo- 
tion to the plans of Germany than it had been in tria-Hungary 
1908, for Serbia's increased power and influence, as 
noted above, was seriously affecting not only the 
Jugo-Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula, but also those 
in Austria-Hungary. That was especially alarming 
to the Teutonic Powers, for the Jugo-Slavs in Aus- 
tria numbered 24,000,000, while there were only 
12,000,000 Germans and 10,000,000 Magyars in 
the Dual Monarchy. 

In spite of their smaller numbers, however, jugo-siavs 
for a long time the Germans and the Magyars, Hungary*" 
by uniting for their mutual profit, had prevented restive and 
the Jugo-Slavs from having their just rights in 1 n en ec 
the management of the affairs of the empire. But 
this could not continue, for the Jugo-Slavs were 
growing stronger by reason of their closer racial 



60 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Serbia's 

success 

threatens 

the Austro- 

Hungarian 

Empire 



The Jugo- 
slavs in the 
Austro- 
Hungarian 
Empire 



organization; and were increasing more rapidly 
in numbers because of their higher birth-rate. 
They became restive and discontented, claim- 
ing for themselves the political rights and powers 
proportionate to the greater number of their people 
in the empire. 

87. Both Austria and Germany Disturbed over the 
Power and Influence of Serbia. — The Austrian Gov- 
ernment, therefore, had reason to be greatly dis- 
turbed on its own account over the power and in- 
fluence of Serbia in the Balkan Peninsula; for if 
Serbia should expand to include Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, this might lead to a revolt of the disaffected 
Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary, and even to their 
withdrawal from that empire. In other words, the 
success of Serbia threatened to break up Austria- 
Hungary. 

Furthermore, even though the Jugo-Slavs should 
remain in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they 
might, under the influence of the Jugo-Slavs in 
Serbia, insist upon their rights to the point of de- 
manding federation. If this should be done, there 
might be not only Austria and Hungary but also a 
third division in the empire made up of Jugo- 
Slavs. In such a federated empire the Jugo-Slavs, 
far outnumbering the Germans and the Magyars, 
could control the foreign relations of the empire. 
In that case, inasmuch as they bitterly hated Prus- 
sianism, they would upset the plans of German 
domination of Austria, and without such domina- 




SERBIAN WOMEN 



62 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



A large in- 
crease in 
the German 
army 



Germany 
becomes 
more and 
more asser- 
tive and 
insolent 



tion the " Berlin to Bagdad" scheme and the much 
more ambitious Pan-German scheme of dominating 
the Balkan Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire 
would come to naught. 

88. Germany and Austria Resolve that Serbia 
must be Crushed. — Therefore, at the close of the 
Second Balkan War, when the peace was signed on 
August 10 ; 1913, both Germany and Austria re- 
solved that Serbia must be crushed. It was only 
a matter of time when the deed was to be done. 
They both stood expectant, eagerly waiting for the 
opportune moment when they could spring upon 
their despised victim and crush out her life. 

89. Germany is Set upon Triumphing over the 
Jugo-Slavs in Serbia even though It Means War 
with Russia and France. — Meantime, Germany, 
knowing that Turkey and Bulgaria, upon whom 
she had been depending for military support, were 
weakened by their overwhelming defeats in 1912 
and 1913, at once set about making a large increase 
in the German army. A great European crisis 
was rapidly approaching, for Germany was de- 
termined to triumph over the Jugo-Slavs in Serbia, 
even if it meant war with Russia and France. 
She had become more and more assertive, insolent, 
and bellicose, striving to maintain her prestige unim- 
paired even at the cost of an awful cataclysm in- 
volving the whole of Europe. Though we did not 
know it then as we do now, Germany's inordinate 
hunger for wealth and her insane ambition for 



The great war 63 

glory had grown so enormously that " world domin- 
ion or downfall!" had become the familiar watch- 
word of militarists and Pan-Germanistsy of the 
Junkers and the Prussian war-lords. 

In November, 1913, less than three months "Warwitfr 
after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which F ^|f .^7 
brought to a close the Second Balkan War, William says the 
II of Germany gave the word to King Albert of Kaiser 
Belgium, who was visiting him at Potsdam: "War 
with France is inevitable and is near." That war 
with France might mean war with many other na- 
tions William II must have known, but his war- 
mad military leaders had weighed the chances and 
believed that Germany stood ready to win. 



CHAPTER VIII 

WHY AND HOW GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 
BROUGHT ON THE WORLD WAR 

90. Political Agitation in Favor of a Greater Ser- The very ex- 
bia Threatens Austria-Hungary. — Political agitation ^ e a ° f 
among the Jugo-Slavs constantly grew in intensity threatened 
and effectiveness, and much of it had its origin in 
Serbia. Serbian newspapers, as well as a secret 
political organization, worked continuously in the 
interests of a Greater Serbia, spreading abroad 
propaganda which seriously threatened the power 
and in fact the very existence of Austria. The 
agitators declared that Austria, in annexing Bosnia 



64 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



How Ger- 
many and 
Austria re- 
gard the 
shocking 
deed 



The Pots- 
dam Con- 
ference 



and Herzegovina ; had robbed Serbia of what was 
rightly her own; that Austria was Serbia's most 
bitter enemy and desired to crush her. They even 
went so far as to say that Serbia's interests would 
be advanced by Austria's destruction. 

91. The Assassination of the Archduke Ferdi- 
nand (June 28, 19 14). — Thoroughly awake to the 
possibilities; Germany and Austria were firmly re- 
solved to put an end to Slavic influence in the 
Balkan Peninsula. They awaited only a favorable 
opportunity. The pretext for which they were 
seeking came in the assassination; on June 28, 1914; 
of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Crown Prince 
of the Austrian imperial throne, and his wife. 
They were murdered by a Jugo-Slav in the streets of 
the little city of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. 
This shocking deed was rightly regarded by Ger- 
many and Austria as a political protest against Aus- 
tria's attitude toward Jugo-Slavic aspirations. The 
Austrian Government charged that the murder was 
committed not only with the knowledge and ap- 
proval of the Serbian Government; but that it was 
part and parcel of the Serbian conspiracy against 
the Dual Monarchy. 

92. A Humiliating Ultimatum to Serbia. — A week 
after the assassination a conference of German and 
Austrian leaders was held at Potsdam, at which it 
was decided to use the murder as a pretext for carry- 
ing out the plan to crush Serbia. Accordingly; on 
July 23; the first step was taken by sending Serbia 



THE GREAT WAR 65 

a diplomatic note in the form of a humiliating ulti- 
matum , involving not only her honor but her very 
existence as an independent state. She was granted 
but forty-eight hours in which to give an answer of 
complete submission or go to war — although several 
of the demands involved a total change in her con- 
stitution, which could not be made except by calling 
together her Parliament and getting a vote of 
approval. 

The terms dictated to her in this outrageous state An out- 
paper were extremely drastic. "I have never g^fte*"^ er 
seen/' said Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign 
secretary , "one nation address to another a docu- 
ment of so formidable a character." Said the 
German Socialist newspaper, Vorwdrts: "The de- 
mands of that government" — referring to Austria 
— "are more brutal than any ever made upon a 
civilized state in the history of the world, and they 
can be regarded as only intended to provoke war." 
If, in a word, Serbia had complied with the condi- 
tions demanded in the ultimatum, she would have 
become to all intents and purposes a vassal state 
to Austria. 

And yet, strange to say, the one fear that found Fear in 
expression throughout Germany was that Serbia J^there 
might accept the terms in their entirety, leaving might not 
no excuse for Austria to make war upon her. 
This would have been a great disappointment, for 
such a miraculous chance might never come again, 
providing at once for barbaric Teuton revenge 



66 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Russia's 
weakness 



Serbia 
swallows 
the bitter 
dose 



and the achievement of the great Pan-German 
dream. 

93. Why Russia Advises Serbia to Submit. — Out- 
rageous as were the terms ; the prospect of war with 
the powerful German organization; backed by 
unfailing supplies, was so dreadful that even Russia 
advised Serbia to submit. For if Serbia stood out, 
and the war came, Russia must in honor take her 
side. She could not again yield after protest as 
in 1908 on the Bosnia-Herzegovina question without 
becoming thereafter despised by all as a "bluffer." 
Yet she well knew that she was in no condition fco 
undertake war. Her armies were being remade, 
her finances were low and her supplies scanty, and 
her always sparse and defective transportation was 
half paralyzed by labor troubles. She therefore 
made every effort to avert a crisis; and Serbia, 
too weak to fight alone and with no friend back of 
her, swallowed this bitter dose and accepted all 
the terms save two, which took away her sover- 
eignty as a state. Even these she agreed to sub- 
mit to The Hague or to the great Powers of Europe. 

94. Austria Wants War, and Germany Gives Her 
Ally Unstinted Support. — But Austria did not want 
acceptance; she had purposely made the terms 
so harsh that they could not be accepted by any 
self-respecting state. She wanted war, and de- 
clared the answer equivalent to a rejection. Ger- 
many gave her ally unstinted support. She felt 
confident that Russia would not take a firm stand; 



THE GREAT WAR 67 

and that if Russia did not intervene, the situation 
was safe, for Serbia would soon be overwhelmed, 
since it was almost certain that neither France nor 
England was prepared for war. 

95. France not Ready for War. — The French 
people were most pacific; French armies were not 
only inferior in numbers, but below the best mark 
in equipment. Besides, the French system of trans- 
portation was lacking in order and in rapidity. 
There was no doubt, in Teutonic military circles, 
that if France should go to war in 1914, the mobili- 
zation of her armies would break down in utter 
confusion. 

96. England, According to German Secret-Service The situa- 
Agents, almost Sure not to Intervene. — England England 
likewise, according to reports from German secret- 
service agents there, was almost sure not to inter- 
vene. She had less than 200,000 soldiers in service, 
three-fourths of them being in the East, against 

the German millions, all at home; and she could 
not add a thousand to them except through a 
tedious parliamentary debate and estimates. The 
Home Rule troubles, threatening imminent civil 
war, were believed to presage disruption even of 
Great Britain, and, at best, would tie her hands; 
the discontented classes in India would produce an- 
other mutiny if Britain got into war; the great col- 
onies would not stand by her and spend blood and 
money for a war in which they had no interest. 
More than all, the English people cared only for 



68 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Opening of 
the Kiel 
Canal 



Germany 
declares 
war upon 
Russia and 
France 



trade — so the Germans believed — and not for na- 
tional honor or pride, and did not consider the 
Balkan affairs their concern. Such was the report 
of German secret-service agents. 

97. Whatever Happens, Germany and Austria 
Are Ready for War. — But even if all of the Entente 
Powers should unite in war against Germany and 
Austria, it was wiser to enter into conflict with 
them in 1914, according to Teutonic military ex- 
perts, than to wait until a later time; for Germany 
was then relatively stronger than she would be a 
few years later, when the other nations would be 
better prepared for war. Only a few days before 
the Potsdam Conference, the enlarged Kiel Canal 
had been officially opened. It could let in or out 
the entire German navy in sixteen hours; and that 



navy, 



on which vast sums had been lavished for 



many years, was believed to be able to neutralize, 
and perhaps even overcome, the English navy. 

98. The Rapid Movement of Events. — Events 
moved with startling rapidity, Germany all the 
while forcing a situation which would result either 
in abject humiliation to both Serbia and her 
protector Russia, or war. On July 28, Austria 
declared war upon Serbia. On July 29, Russia be- 
gan to mobilize her armies. Two days later, Ger- 
many sent an ultimatum to Russia in which she 
demanded that mobilization in that country should 
at once cease. Receiving no reply, she declared 
war upon Russia on August 1; and on getting an 




FOREIGN SECRETARY BALFOUR 



70 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

unsatisfactory answer to an ultimatum to France, 
she declared war upon that country on August 3. 

99. William II and German Military Leaders 
well Satisfied. — William II and the German mili- 
tary leaders were thus far well satisfied with the 
way events were moving. With England neutral, 
it would be a comparatively easy task to crush 
France by making a rapid attack, and then to 
turn upon Russia and overwhelm her. For, owing 
to long distances as well as to insufficient and in- 
effective railroads, it was thought that Russia's 
mobilization would be very slow. 
Germany's ioo. Germany Commits a Great Diplomatic Blunder 

BdtaS a b y violatin g the Neutrality of Belgium.— It was Ger- 
high out- many's plan to seize Paris at once. But in her at- 
rage tempt to make a speedy advance upon that city, 

she committed her first great diplomatic blunder 
of the war. She invaded Belgium, whose neu- 
trality she had guaranteed by treaty; and although 
that same treaty made Belgium liable to punish- 
ment if she allowed German forces or those of any 
other Power to pass through her territory, Ger- 
many demanded a free passage. This was a high 
outrage. As to the excuse later sown broadcast 
that France would have invaded Belgium if Ger- 
many had not done so, it was false; for France had 
already solemnly assured Belgium, and the assur- 
ance had been transmitted to Germany, that she 
would not enter Belgian territory. 

The German chancellor, von Bethmann-Holl- 



THE GREAT WAR 71 

weg, made no such pretense at the time, but England's 
merely pleaded military necessity; and in urging g t ^° e rat 
Mr. Goschen, the British ambassador to Germany, 
to overlook the breach of this treaty, referred to it 
as a scrap of paper. But it was far more than 
that to England, for she had pledged her word to 
respect and preserve the neutrality of Belgium. 
Therefore, her honor was at stake, and that she 
would protect even at the cost of a long and terrible 
war. 

101. England's Safety Involved. — Moreover, her 
safety also was involved. As a matter of fact, the 
neutrality of Belgium, as a cardinal principle of 
English foreign policy, stood on an almost equal 
footing with the necessity of her naval supremacy. 
If a great Power like Germany should get control 
of the Belgian coast and establish strong naval 
bases there, England's danger in war would be 
greatly increased. For it would be easy for such a 
Power to launch attacks against English shipping in 
the North Sea, and against the great seaports on 
the south coast of England. The mouth of the 
Thames also would be a most vulnerable point on 
the eastern coast, its control rendering the invasion 
of that country comparatively easy. 

102. Germany Confident of Triumphant Victory. — 
Germany was well aware of these conditions, but, 
as we have seen, she believed that England would 
not go to war at that time; and even if she should, 
Germany believed herself all-sufficient for the task 



72 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



she had deliberately taken up. The hour of her 
destiny had struck. Victory, she believed, was 
certain. World dominion, the glorious dream of 
the Kaiser and the Prussian war-lords, was await- 
ing only her triumphant grasp. 



German 
barbarities 
in Belgium 



Sixteen 

priceless 

days 



CHAPTER IX 
SOME STRIKING EVENTS OF THE WAR 

103. The Brave Little Belgian Army Holds Back 
the German Host. — The German military machine 
moved with scientific precision and marvellous 
rapidity; but in Belgium, through which it had 
hoped to march at full speed without serious opposi- 
tion, it met with a stubborn resistance that cost 
it the war in the end. At the outset the brave 
little Belgian army held back the German host 
three days at Liege, and then several days more 
at the now famous university city of Lou vain. 
In revenge for this, and to terrify other places so 
as to prevent resistance, the furious invaders 
visited several towns with wholesale massacre of 
innocent citizens of all ages and both sexes, and 
burned a part of Louvain to the ground, including 
its irreplaceable old library. 

On August 20, the German armies entered Brus- 
sels without opposition. Sixteen days — priceless 
days to their enemies — they had spent in Belgian 



74 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



territory; priceless for two reasons: flrst ; because 
they gave time for the French to mobilize their 
troops and mass them in northeastern France to op- 




Versaill 



ROUTES OF THE GERMAN ARMIES THROUGH BELGIUM 



pose the German onrush; second, because they per- 
mitted Britain to send across the Channel an 
advance force of 100,000, nearly all the few reg- 
ulars kept at home and a few reserves hurriedly 
collected— the "contemptible little English army/ 7 
the Kaiser called it, but composed of the same 
kind of heroes as those who held the hedge 
before Waterloo. 




From a photograph by the Belgian Official Pictorial Service. 
KING ALBERT 



76 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



The Ger- 
mans sweep 
forward 
with ever- 
increasing 
power 



Retreat of 
the French 
and the 
English 



General 
Jofifre bides 
his time 



104. The Allied Troops Retreat Without Confusion 
Before the Resistless Human Tide. — The French 
and the British troops now joined the Belgians. 
But, all told, the three allied armies for weeks were 
so inferior in numbers that they could hope to do 
nothing more than delay for a little the resistless 
hordes of Germans that swept forward with ever- 
increasing power and confidence. Fortresses among 
the strongest in Europe for an age, and until 
within a few years impregnable, crumbled like sand 
before the enormous new German artillery. At 
Namur and at Mons, on August 22 and 23, the 
invading army, under the command of Gen- 
eral von Kluck, defeated the Allies and then 
pressed on with the full expectation of captur- 
ing Paris at an early day. Over a two-hundred- 
mile front tens of miles slipped behind them, 
while the French and the English continued to 
retreat, yet without confusion. At one time 
the Germans were only fifteen miles from the 
French capital. 

105. The Famous Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10, 
1914). — But something akin to a miracle — as it 
seemed then — was the barring of the triumphant 
progress of the Germans. General Joffre,the French 
commander, had been biding his time. With a stoical 
judgment he sacrificed temporary possession of 
France to its ultimate recovery, showing a restraint 
which was only less marvellous than that the French 
should allow him to do it without taking away his 




MARSHAL JOFFRE 



78 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



command. Instead of rushing his entire army to 
the German front, and having nothing with which 
to hold the enemy if his forces were overborne, he 
transferred an important force under Maunoury to 




— Battle Line of Sept. 6, 1914 



Battle Line of July 15. 1918 -■• 



Battle Line of Nov. 11, 1918 



MAP SHOWING THE WESTERN FRONT 



The Ger- 
mans hur- 
riedly re- 
treat some 
seventy 
miles 



his left flank, wholly unsuspected by the German 
high command. Then at the right moment, when 
the Germans had flung two great wings north and 
south to encircle Paris, he hurled one of his corps 
against the juncture of one wing with the main 
body, while General Foch assailed the other wing 
near the centre. 

The Germans had been allowed to cross the 
Marne River, where from September 6 to September 
10 the two armies fought furiously. Then the 



THE GREAT WAR 79 

invaders, menaced with the possibility of having 
their advance lines cut off from the main army 
and forced to surrender, hurriedly retreated some 
seventy miles toward Germany. Paris was saved, 
and so, as it turned out, was France and the cause 
of the Allies. 

1 06. The Germans, Outfought and Outgeneralled, Russia as- 
Are Forced to Retreat. — The battle of the Marne ^worid 
proved not merely that the German army, after by her 
forty years of the most scientific preparation and spee 
with limitless equipment, was not invincible, but 

that the vaunted, unerring German strategy was 
not inspired. The Germans had been both out- 
fought and outgeneralled. They retreated as far 
as the Aisne River, where they took shelter in 
trenches which had been made ready for them. 

107. The Splendid Service of Russia and Belgium. 
— In the meantime, Russia had bitterly surprised 
the German military leaders and astonished the 
world by the speed with which she had mobilized 
her armies. She had invaded Germany in East 
Prussia and Austria in Galicia, in each case advanc- 
ing far beyond her frontier. Although badly de- 
feated at Tannenberg, in East Prussia, on August 
29, she had compelled the Germans to send a large 
army to meet her forces there; and thus, by re- 
ducing the number of Germans that could be 
utilized against France, had made it easier for the 
Allies to stay the onward rush of the foe on the 
western front. 



80 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

How Ger- If Belgium had not delayed the German army for 

many's plan marl y days, a nd if Russia had not been so rapid in 
feated her mobilization, there is little doubt that Paris 

would have been captured and the French over- 
whelmed in six or seven weeks after the war began, 
according to the plan of the German high command. 
Germany's Germany's hope of success lay in rapid conquest, 
hope of rapid anc [ ^ mvas i n of Belgium was prompted by that 

conquest ° r- r- j 

expectation. She depended upon crushing France 
before Russia was ready, after which she could mass 
her troops upon the eastern frontier and over- 
whelm the Russian army. Nothing would then 
stand in the way of her concentrating her forces 
upon England, and having conquered her, she 
could unite the vanquished British fleet with her 
own and in due time she might cross the Atlantic 
for the conquest of the United States. 

1 08. The Disappointment and Chagrin of the 
Kaiser and His Prussian War-Lords. — It is easy to 
imagine the disappointment and chagrin of the 
German Kaiser and his Prussian war-lords when 
they found their machine overmatched in about 
five weeks from the day their great armies had 
crossed the frontiers of brave little Belgium. 
Russian 1 09. The Russian Defeat at the Battle of the 

Gaiick m Dunajec. — There was some terrible fighting on the 
western front in the months following the battle 
of the Marne. But for more than a year the 
eastern front was the main centre of interest; for 
the Russians were so successful in Galicia that 



THE GREAT WAR 



81 



they threatened to break down the whole military 
machine of Austria. To prevent this and to- try 






<* e'^jF.^} ^v " -w^ 'Murmans 



A N 









^Stockholm/ 1^8 &%*>>** ^J»&®„ . j 




a? 




is 

? Sevastopolt^^ 
@ Buclferftt gL ^ eg SEA 



THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR 



to crush Russia, a huge German army was sent into 
Galicia, where, on the 1st of May, 1915, began the 
battle of the Dunajec, in which the Russian army, 



82 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



The Ger- 
mans ad- 
vance far 
into Russia 



What the 
German 
military 
leaders 
hoped to ac- 
complish 



" They 
shall not 
pass " 



betrayed by its largely German civil administra- 
tion, and fighting without arms, since its supply 
system was a wreck, was well-nigh destroyed. 
The Germans then continued to press eastward 
until they had advanced far into Russian territory, 
and for a time almost completely broke down 
Russian military power. 

no. The Great Battle for the Possession of Ver- 
dun (beginning in February, 191 5). — It was not until 
early in 1916, however, that the German high 
command dared release enough troops from the 
east to make another attempt to win a decisive 
victory on the western front, capture Paris, and 
conquer France. They believed that there was 
still time to do this before England could organize, 
train, and send across the Channel an army suf- 
ficiently powerful to save France from overwhelm- 
ing defeat. 

Accordingly, in February, 1916, they massed a 
large army for an attack upon Verdun, a French 
city surrounded by hills overlooking the valley of 
the Meuse River, and every one strongly fortified. 
It was a strategic centre, because it threatened 
Lorraine, the principal iron region of Germany, 
and it had long been considered one of the most 
formidable positions in Europe. Month in and 
month out the great battle raged for the posses- 
sion of Verdun, the two armies sacrificing half a 
million men in their determination to win victory 
at any cost. The French, pushed back to within 



84 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



two or three miles of the city but making every 
rod cost the Germans thousands of lives, heroi- 
cally held their position, inspired by the watch- 




THE TURKISH THEATRE OF WAR 



Why Tur- 
key joins 
Germany 



word, "They shall not pass." At the end of six 
months the Germans drew off, with another baffling 
defeat to their record. 

in. Turkey Enters the War on the Side of Ger- 
many. — Turning to the east again, we find that 
vitally important events were occurring there 
also. Turkey had joined Germany by secret treaty 
just before the war began, though not actively en- 



86 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



The Allies 
desire to 
influence 
Bulgaria 
and Greece 



gaged in the war for some months. The alliance 
seemed to Turkey wise, for not only was she the 
natural ally of Germany as the key to her east- 
ern plan, but Germany in turn was Turkey 's only 
defense against Russia. Germany, she expected, 
would devour her ultimately, but without Ger- 
many the Allies were certain to dismember her at 
once. 

112. Turkey's Accession Adds Two Formidable 
Dangers to the Allied List. — Turkey's accession 
added two formidable dangers to the allied list. 
One, an attack on the Suez Canal to cut off England 
from the short route to India, was attempted at 
once; the other, a land invasion of India through 
Persia, soon followed. Even though unsuccessful, 
these attempts forced England to fit out and sup- 
port two more long-distance armaments to meet 
the new dangers. 

113. The Allies Attempt to Capture Constanti- 
nople (1915). — The Allies planned to attack Con- 
stantinople and cut the Turco-German communica- 
tions with Asia. This campaign, if successful, 
would accomplish two other purposes of command- 
ing importance. It would let Russian grain ships 
down through the Bosporus and Dardanelles with 
food for the western allies, and would let military 
supplies up through to sustain Russia. There was 
even a faint hope of its demonstrating to Bulgaria, 
whose king was a German princelet, and to Greece, 
whose queen was sister of the Kaiser, that the 



THE GREAT WAR 87 

chances of war were going against Germany, and so 
of inducing them, if not to join the Allies, at 
least to allow the allied armies to pass through their 
territory in order to attack Austria in the rear. 

In making the attempt to capture Constantinople, a serious 
a large allied fleet of English and French war- set-back for 

° the allied 

vessels advanced to the narrowest part of the Dar- cause 
danelles, where each bank was commanded by 
formidable defenses. There was a furious battle 
in which the English and French lost several large 
vessels. Then they withdrew to a point where 
they could land their forces on the Gallipoli Pen- 
insula, which is on the European shore of the Dar- 
danelles; but here they found the Turkish position 
almost impregnable, and after a heavy loss of 
men they abandoned the enterprise in December, 
1915. It was a serious set-back for the allied cause. 

114. Serbia is Practically Annihilated (1915). — Bulgaria 
The expedition against Constantinople was only ^f^the 
one unfortunate event -for the Allies in that region. s ide of 

Germany 

Serbia, almost at the beginning of the war, had 
been invaded by Austria; but she had stood 
up so bravely against the attack that by De- 
cember the invaders were driven out of her ter- 
ritory. In the autumn of 1915, however, she was 
confronted by her old enemy, Bulgaria. That 
country, with the hope of getting back the terri- 
tory which she had lost in the Second Balkan War 
(1913) had made a defensive treaty with Turkey 
and in October, 1915, declared war upon Serbia. 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Rumania 
joins the 
Allies 



Blockade 
of the 
German 
coast 



By the end of that year, Serbia was practically 
annihilated. Her whole army was destroyed ex- 
cept a small remnant which escaped across Albania 
to the Adriatic Sea. 

Germany and Austria had achieved their pur- 
pose of conquering all enemy territory that lay be- 
tween them and the Turkish Empire. The coveted 
path was open from Berlin to Constantinople. 

115. Rumania Meets with Disaster (1916). — 
Another old-time enemy of Bulgaria, Rumania, 
met with disaster, although not so ruinous as that 
meted out to Serbia. It had long been her desire 
to incorporate in her territory the more than two 
million Rumanians dwelling across the Carpathian 
Mountains in Transylvania, which was a part of 
Austria-Hungary. The Allies knew this and, wish- 
ing to gain her help, promised the aid of a Russian 
army if she would invade Transylvania. She did 
so, but the treacherous pro-German controllers of 
Russia, having encouraged her to start, sent no 
troops. Her army was overwhelmed by German 
and Austrian troops greatly outnumbering her own 
and her country was entirely overrun. She experi- 
enced the usual suffering which accompanied Ger- 
man victories — pillage and massacre and being 
stripped of food to supply her conquerors while her 
own people starved. 

116. The Great Efficiency of the British Navy. — 
From the land operations we turn to the exploits of 
the British navy, which from the beginning of the 




From a photograph, copyright by Underwood and Underwood 

ADMIRAL BEATTY 



90 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



The English 
navy's 
remarkable 
achieve- 
ments 



war, showed far greater efficiency on the sea than 
did the German army on the land. It swept Ger- 
man commerce from the ocean ; drove the German 
navy to Kiel Harbor for shelter, and established a 
blockade over German ports which proved disastrous 
to the German cause, by shutting out food and 
military supplies. 

While holding off the enemy's commerce the Eng- 
lish navy was equally effective in protecting the 
transportation of food and other supplies between 
the allied countries. It made the Channel, forty 
miles in breadth, a ferry across which day and 
night were conveyed troops and supplies to France, 
without the loss from enemy attacks of a man, a 
vessel, or a pound of food or munitions in over 
four years. In fact, perhaps it is not too much to 
say that the greatest force in bringing about fail- 
ure of the Teutonic Powers was the British navy. 
The greatest 1 1 7. The Naval Battle of Jutland Ends in Victory 
of all history f° r tne British Grand Fleet (May 31, 19 16). — It 
was nearly two years before the German navy ven- 
tured out of Kiel Harbor for battle. When finally 
it did appear on May 31, 1916, from the standpoint 
of tonnage and armament the greatest naval bat- 
tle of all history was fought. The action took place 
off the coast of Jutland, the peninsula of Den- 
mark. Taking advantage of a fog, Admiral von 
Scheer, who was in command of the German high- 
seas fleet, slipped out of Kiel Harbor on that 
day, and was met by the English battle-cruiser 




ADMIRAL JELLICOE 



92 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

squadron, under the command of Admiral Beatty, 
who was reinforced later by the British grand 
fleet, under the command of Admiral Jellicoe. 
The The Germans claimed victory, but they suffered 

fleeTruns defeat, for their fleet withdrew under cover of the 
away darkness to its hiding-place, and left the British 

supremacy of the seas unbroken. Never again dur- 
ing the remaining years of the Great War did the 
German high-seas fleet venture out into the open 
sea to engage the British grand fleet. 



CHAPTER X 
OUR COUNTRY ENTERS THE WAR 

The reason n8. President Wilson's Proclamation of Neutral- 

wnson's ent ity- — Shortly after the outbreak of the great conflict 
proclamation j n -j-,h e summ er of 1914, President Wilson issued a 
proclamation in which he advised all American citi- 
zens to "act and speak in the true spirit of im- 
partiality and friendliness to all concerned." This 
position he took because the United States had al- 
ways tried to avoid taking part in quarrels arising 
between European countries. 
American 1 19. The American People at First Surprised and 

followed by tnen Indignant at Germany's Lawless and Cruel 
indignation Conduct. — But the course of events brought about 
a change in the attitude of the American people. 
When Germany, in order to gain an easier and 



THE GREAT WAR 93 

shorter route to Paris, broke the treaty by which 
she promised to observe the neutrality of Belgium, 
Americans were surprised. When after invading 
that peaceful and innocent country, she devastated 
its fields, confiscated its treasure, and slew its 
men, women, and children with a cruelty incredible 
in a civilized world, surprise was followed by in- 
dignation. 

120. The Conviction Grows Among many Ameri- The con- 
cans that the United States Will Be Forced into the S^£ods of 
War. — Our people then began to awaken to the the German 
character of the evil spirit which controlled Ger- leaders 
many's ambitious and war -mad policy; and 
gradually, in the progress of the war, the convic- 
tion grew among many Americans that in spite of 

our strong desire to keep out of the conflict, the arro- 
gant and conscienceless methods of the German 
military leaders were certain, sooner or later, to 
force the United States to take up arms against 
Germany. They saw, also, with increasing clear- 
ness that domination of Europe and Asia and the 
seas by Germany meant domination of America; 
and that if we allowed the Allies to be crushed, we 
should have no power to resist the new mistress 
of the world, flushed with arrogance, exultation, 
and revenge. 

121. Germany's Piratical and Inhuman Submarine Why we 
Policy. — But the immediate and by far the most w*a r ere 
important cause of our entering the war was Ger- 
many's piratical and inhuman submarine policy. 



94 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Our 

extensive 
commerce 
and industry 



German 
authorities 
assume 
control of 
food-supplies 



It will be of interest for us to consider why the Ger- 
man military authorities thought it wise to adopt 
this policy; and how it made such serious friction 
between the two countries that our national self- 
respect; and our sense of right and justice , finally 
compelled us to become a belligerent nation. 

122. The Conflict Puts a Political Strain upon 
Neutral Nations. — The conflict, which involved all 
the great European Powers, put a political strain 
on the neutral nations who wished to maintain 
their friendship with all the warring countries. 
This was especially true of the United States on 
account of our extensive commerce and industry, 
which were greatly affected by the war. 

123. Each Belligerent Power Tries to Destroy the 
Enemy's Commerce. — To prevent all supplies from 
reaching the enemy was of vital importance to 
both sides. The Allies, at the outset, were success- 
ful in completely destroying the direct ocean com- 
merce with Germany except through the Baltic 
Sea; while the harm that Germany could inflict 
upon British commerce by the few submarines and 
roving cruisers which she then had was small. 

Up to the opening of this war, food intended for 
civilians had never been considered as contraband, 
and hence could not be lawfully seized at sea when 
it was on the way to a belligerent port. But 
changed conditions brought about new methods. 
Some time after the war began, German authori- 
ties, including those of cities as well as those 




FIELD-MARSHAL LORD KITCHENER 



96 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



England 
establishes a 
war zone and 
Germany 
retaliates 



A note of 
warning 



Germany's 
reply evasive 
and un- 
satisfactory 



of the imperial government, assumed control of 
food-supplies in Germany. This caused Great 
Britain to declare, on February 2, 1915, that all 
food imported into Germany was contraband. 
The truth is that under a system of universal 
military service the whole nation is practically an 
army ; and all its supplies are military supplies. 

Moreover, Germany had placed mines in the 
North Sea for the defense of her coasts, and 
these were frequently found in the open sea far 
away from the shore, in violation of interna- 
tional law. To offset this, England established a 
"war zone" in the North Sea, with only a single 
lane for neutral vessels. On February 4, 1915, 
Germany retaliated by declaring a war zone which 
included all the waters around Great Britain, and 
asserted that in this zone she would destroy all 
enemy vessels. She said it might not be possible 
to save crews and passengers, and, moreover, that 
neutral vessels sailing in this zone would be in 
danger. 

Without delay, our government sent to Germany 
a note of warning, declaring in vigorous language 
that it would hold that country " strictly account- 
able" if any American vessels should be destroyed 
or any American lives lost. 

Germany's reply was evasive and unsatisfactory. 
It was, in effect, as follows: "Inasmuch as Great 
Britain has put an end to our trade by blockading 
our coasts, we are simply acting in self-defense." 



THE GREAT WAR 97 

124. The Germans Torpedo and Sink the " Lusi- Many 
tania" (May 7, 1915). — During the next three Xnidre/are 
months, Germany repeatedly insulted our nation Victims 1 * 
by attacking and sinking American vessels and 
destroying American lives. But the crowning 
outrage — which horrified the whole country — was 

the sinking of the Lusitania, an English passenger 
vessel of the Cunard line, on May 7, 1915, near the 
coast of Ireland, while she was on her way from 
New York to Liverpool. She was attacked with- 
out a moment's warning and sent to the bottom 
by a torpedo. Of the 1,154 lives lost, 114 were 
Americans, among the innocent victims being 
many women and children. 

It is significant of the German method that 
Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador 
at Washington, advertised in the New York city 
daily newspapers a warning in which he advised 
against sailing on the Lusitania. Americans re- 
fused to believe that this advertisement of calcu- 
lated and wholesale homicide was official, and sailed 
on the fated ship. 

President Wilson again sent a vigorous note of A hideous 
protest against this hideous and barbaric deed; deed * 
for, according to a law of long standing among the 
nations, no merchant or passenger vessel could be 
sunk at sea without warning and without providing 
for the safety of crew and passengers. 

125. Germany Continues the Torpedoing of Mer- 
chant Vessels Without Warning. — But Germany's 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Germany's 
contempt 
for the 
American 
people 



Germany's 

empty 

promise 



answer was far from satisfactory. In fact, she 
showed no concern over the bitterness and indigna- 
tion she had aroused in America. Her contempt 
for the American people appeared in her authoriz- 
ing her submarine commanders to continue the 
torpedoing of merchant and passenger vessels, 
without warning and without giving crews and 
passengers a fair chance to save their lives. 

Within three months after the Lusitania incident, 
our government sent to Germany three notes of 
indignant protest and emphatic warning. Ger- 
many sent no answer but she torpedoed another 
vessel, the Arabic, on August 19, 1915, with the 
loss of two American lives. 

126. Germany Promises to Sink no more Liners 
Without Warning. — Again our government protested 
with vigor. In replying, Germany expressed re- 
gret at the sinking of the Arabic, and declared her 
willingness to pay indemnities for destroying Amer- 
ican lives. She went still further by declaring 
that orders had been sent out to her submarine 
commanders forbidding them in future to make 
attacks upon neutral merchantmen which put in 
peril the lives of crews and passengers. She added 
that she would sink no more liners; that is, passenger 
vessels — without giving a warning before the attack, 
unless, of course, they resisted or tried to escape. 

This fair promise made a good impression upon 
many American people. However, it was empty, 
and ended where it began, for Germany's future 



THE GREAT WAR 99 

acts showed that she did not intend to keep her 
word when the promise was given, and official 
utterances since published confirm this. 

127. Germany Secretly Acts as Our Enemy in Basely 
many Ways. — Neglecting no opportunity, she was pi^against 
secretly acting as our enemy in many ways. She !^£f encan 
had hatched many plots against the peace, safety, 

and industry of the American people at home. 
These plots were the more basely criminal because 
they were largely planned and directed by the 
German embassy and other German officials at 
Washington, whose immunity from our laws and 
taxes and whose protection under our laws were 
based, like that of all other foreign representatives, 
on their good faith in not perpetrating offenses 
against the government to which they were ac- 
credited. 

Agitators were employed to foment strikes in The killing 
important American industries. Men who were °f innocent 8 
ready for any criminal violence were engaged to ™ndcMdrln' 
place bombs in the holds of vessels bound for Eng- 
land or France, and to blow up munition factories, 
thus killing hundreds of innocent men, women, 
and children. Strong attempts were made, over 
and over again, to bring about serious trouble be- 
tween Japan and the United States. 

128. The Climax of German Treachery and In- Germany 
trigue. — But the climax of German treachery and amancewltn 
intrigue against the American Government and MexlC0 
the American people took place in January, 1917. 



100 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



German 
faithlessness 
and 
treachery 



German 
barbarity 



In a note which the German foreign minister sent 
to the German minister in Mexico, he proposed "an 
alliance on the following basis: That we shall 
make war together and together make peace. 
We shall give general financial support, and it is 
understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost 
territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona." 

This base act, when brought to light by our 
State Department, aroused profound indignation 
throughout the United States. Many Americans 
who before this time had not been inclined to be- 
lieve in the faithlessness and treachery of Germany, 
now saw her in her true colors, ready to stoop to 
any crime, however dastardly it might be, to carry 
out her own selfish plots and schemes. Success 
being her chief aim, any method that she might 
employ, no matter how unscrupulous, brutal, or 
criminal it might appear to other nations, she 
considered justifiable. Her point of view was that 
the state — the German state, of course — could do 
no wrong. 

129. " Frightfulness." — In fact, by her method 
of " frightfulness," Germany set out to make war 
terrible, in order to weaken her enemies through 
fear. It was in carrying out this policy that entire 
villages and towns were burned to ashes, merely 
because, as the Germans claimed, their soldiers 
were being shot down by snipers; and that hun- 
dreds and thousands of innocent civilians, includ- 
ing helpless women and children, were brutally 




RHEIMS CATHEDRAL 



.101 



102 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



German 
submarines 
destroy 226 
American 
lives 



Germany 
defies the 
UnitedStates 
and the 
World 



murdered. As we shall see, these outrages, instead 
of intimidating their enemies, fired them with a 
righteous zeal to fight for their rights. 

130. Destructive Results of Germany's Submarine 
Policy. — Many more examples of Germany's bru- 
tality might easily be given, for they have become 
common knowledge. But it was her operations 
at sea that more directly affected the United 
States. In carrying out her submarine policy up 
to April 2, 1917, Germany attacked 17 American 
merchantmen and 23 foreign vessels which had on 
board American citizens, thus causing the loss of 
226 American lives. 

131. Germany Adopts an Unrestricted Policy of 
Submarine Warfare (February 1, 19 17). — Despite 
the repeated and earnest protests of our govern- 
ment regarding submarine warfare, Germany only 
bided her time. At last, when it seemed to her 
that the day of her certain victory was not far away, 
she became so insolent that she dared openly to 
defy the United States and the rest of the world. 
In a proclamation issued January 31, 1917, she de- 
clared that beginning on the following day she 
would adopt an unrestricted policy of submarine 
warfare, by sinking at sight, and without any 
attempt to safeguard crews and passengers, all 
vessels she might find in extensive areas named by 
her, north and west of northern Europe and in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 

Confirming this declaration the German chan- 



THE GREAT WAR 103 

cellor announced; in an important speech, that Ger- The German 
many was planning to pursue her ruthless sub- shameless S 
marine policy with greater vigor than ever before, announce- 
shamelessly explaining that she had been waiting 
only until she should have enough submarines to 
make her attacks upon the enemy's commerce and 
the world's shipping effective. This was a revela- 
tion that her promise to us had been a mere sub- 
terfuge; it had been made with no intention of 
keeping it. 

But the last straw, which would have shamed a The last 
country of weaklings into war, was a note granting s raw 
"permission" to this great and proud nation to 
send one vessel weekly from New York to London, 
if marked in a certain way that Germany desig- 
nated. Humiliation could not reach a lower depth 
unless we were a subject province. 

132. President Wilson Breaks off Diplomatic Re- 
lations with Germany (February 3, 19 17). — President 
Wilson responded to this note by at once (February 
3) recalling our American ambassador at Berlin 
and by dismissing the German ambassador at 
Washington, which meant that the United States 
had ceased to have diplomatic relations with Ger- 
many. 

133. The United States Enters the War (April The sinking 
6, 19 1 7). — Even after taking this serious step, vessels 
our government was loath to go to war if it could 

be avoided without the loss of our honor and our 
self-respect. But Germany persisted in sending to 



104 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



"We will not 
choose the 
path of 
submission" 



Germany 
drives us 
into war 



the bottom ship after ship (between February 2 
and April 2, 1917, eight American vessels were 
sunk by German submarines), thus brutally mur- 
dering American citizens, until at last President 
Wilson, in a memorable address to Congress on 
April 2, 1917, said: 

"The present submarine warfare against com- 
merce is a warfare against mankind. 

"There is one choice we cannot make. . . . We 
will not choose the path of submission, and suffer 
the most sacred rights of our people to be ignored 
or violated. . . . 

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even 
tragical character of the step I am taking, . . . 
I advise that the Congress declare the recent course 
of the imperial German Government to be, in fact, 
nothing less than war against the Government 
and people of the United States." 

These words had only one meaning, and that was 
that the American people had no other choice but 
to take up arms in defense of their just rights as a 
free people. Germany had driven us into war, 
for she had made war upon us. She had not only 
injured our commerce; she had also violated sacred 
human rights of American citizens, which we, 
as a free nation, are bound to cherish and defend. 
Congress, therefore, on April 6, 1917, declared that 
a condition of war existed between the United 
States and Germany. 

The promptness and zeal with which the Ameri- 




From a photograph, copyright by Brown Brothers 

FOOD ADMINISTRATOR HOOVER 



106 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Four 

pressing 

problems 



What our 
navy could 
do 



can people responded to the action of the govern- 
ment was a signal proof of their loyalty and pa- 
triotism. 

134. Certain Definite Things We Could Do. — 
Although at that time our army was too small to 
be of service on European battle-fields, there were 
certain definite things outside the military sphere 
in which we could give immediate service: (1) We 
could loan the Allies money, so that they could 
buy here or elsewhere what they needed. (2) We 
could supply them with munitions for their armies, 
raw materials for their civilian workers, and food for 
both. (3) We could build merchant ships of suf- 
ficient tonnage to help carry these supplies across 
the ocean. (4) With our navy we could assist in 
fighting the submarine menace. 

Of all these pressing problems, that of supplying 
sufficient ship tonnage to insure transportation 
across the sea was the most important, for without 
its solution the other problems could not be solved. 

135. The Huge Task of Providing an Adequate 
Army and Navy. — An increase in the supply of 
food, ships, munitions, and other material needs 
was an immediate result of our entering upon the 
war. The huge task, of providing an adequate 
army and navy required more time. 

136. Pressing Need of a Large Navy; Its Rapid 
Increase. — Even before the declaration of war, 
President Wilson had ordered the navy to be in- 
creased as rapidly as possible to the full war strength 




From a photograph, copyright by Western Newspaper Union 
ADMIRAL SIMS 



108 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Germany 
scornfully 
laughs at 
American 
preparations 



of 93,000. Now that we were a belligerent nation, 
a powerful navy was an absolute necessity, for it 
was our first line of defense. It was far more. 
It was required, as already seen, to help in destroy- 
ing the German submarines; also to assist in fight- 
ing the German high-seas fleet, if it should steam 
out from its hiding-place; and to act as convoys 
in guarding ships which transported American 
soldiers across the Atlantic. By midsummer of 
1918, the number of men in our navy was more 
than three times as great as it had been when 
we entered the war, and the number of vessels in 
the American naval service had increased fourfold. 

137. " Is It too Late for Our Country to Render 
Efficient Service on the Far- A way Battle Front? " — 
The most important question of all, however, when 
we entered the war in April, 1917, was this: Has 
our country made its great decision to organize 
for war too late to render effective service on 
the battle front 3,000 miles away ? Germany pre- 
tended to believe so, and laughed scornfully at the 
American preparations. She had crushed Belgium, 
Serbia, and Rumania, and had so badly defeated 
Russia that in her political and military weakness 
and confusion she was no longer to be counted as 
a factor in the conflict. Large numbers of Ger- 
man troops in Russia were set free for service on 
the western front. 

Confident of victory, the German high command 
was planning to bring the war to a close before 




CLEARING FOR ACTION 
THE FORECASTLE OF THE BATTLESHIP " MICHIGAN 1 



no 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



"Too late, 
America!" 
say the 
Germans 



Two huge 
blunders 



America could organize, train, and transport over- 
seas armies large enough to have any effective weight 
upon the military decision. They said: "The 
American people are engrossed in material things; 
they are a conglomeration of many races and there- 
fore lacking in unity of purpose; they are pacifists 
and therefore will not respond to the call for 
military service." "But if America should raise 
and train her armies/ ' they continued, "the 
German submarine has been so destructive of 
shipping that these cannot be transported across 
the Atlantic. If, however, in some miraculous 
way, they could reach the battle front, such ama- 
teur fighters could not stand up against our Ger- 
man veterans." "Too late, America!" they said, 
in jeering tones. "You may know how to make 
money, but as a fighting power, you are not worthy 
of serious consideration." 

138. Germany's Second Irreparable Blunder. — 
This attitude strongly reminds us of the Kaiser's 
remark at the beginning of the conflict, when he 
referred to the "contemptible little British army." 
Inside of eighteen months, the Kaiser and his war- 
lords were again to learn to their chagrin and humil- 
iation, as at the Marne, the error of their calcu- 
lation, and to be made aware that with the 
weight of America added to the allied cause, 
the hour of doom for Hohenzollern autocracy 
and Prussian militarism had struck. Germany 
made an irreparable blunder when she decided 



THE GREAT WAR 111 

upon her unrestricted submarine policy and forced 
the United States into the war. It was her second 
huge blunder in the diplomacy of war. The viola- 
tion of Belgian neutrality had caused Great Britain 
to take up arms. The submarine warfare brought 
America into the war. And yet Germany was in- 
sane enough to be contemptuous toward the armies 
of both nations. 

139. The American Nation Ready to Put Forth Her Congress 
Giant Strength. — Our people were now aroused, sefective 
The fire of patriotism was burning in the heart of semce law 
America. The nation was ready to put forth her 

giant strength. Germany and the world were 
astonished to see Congress, at the end of six weeks 
after our declaration of war, pass a selective ser- 
vice law (May 18), which was the first step toward 
calling to the national colors a mighty host of the 
young men of the country. All sections — North, 
South, East, and West — responded with enthusiasm 
by giving their loyal and earnest support to the 
cause which they looked upon as sacred. 

140. A Stupendous Achievement. — Less than A wonderful 
three weeks after the passage of the Army Draft ^ s orma " 
Bill, nearly 10,000,000 young men of draft age, 

which included all who were twenty-one but not 
yet thirty-one, were registered (June 5, 1917).* 
Shortly after the selective service law was passed, 

* By amending the Army Draft Bill in August, 1918, and ex- 
tending the draft age so as to include all men from eighteen to 
forty-five, Congress made available for war service 13,000,000 more. 



112 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



2,000,000 

American 
troops in 
France 



Enormous 
destruction 
of allied and 
neutral 



the government began the important work of 
choosing and training those who were to take 
their places in the ranks of the army. The 
wonderful transformation of the manly , vigorous, 
and loyal young men of America into fighting forces 
is the great outstanding fact of the first year of 
the war. Never was the American genius for or- 
ganization more effectively shown than in the 
stupendous achievement of building up, training, 
and transporting her huge armies to the fighting 
line in France, 3 ; 000 miles away. 

When, early in April, 1917, we went to war with 
Germany, our army numbered only 9,500 officers 
and 202,600 men. A year later, the number had 
increased to nearly 124,000 officers and 1,529,000 
men. Early in July, 1918, there were 1,019,115 
overseas or on their way over. Late in the sum- 
mer means of transportation for 250,000 per month 
were provided; and before the signing of the armis- 
tice on November 11, 1918, there were on Euro- 
pean soil 2,000,000 American troops. Had the war 
lasted until the summer of 1919, this number would 
probably have risen to nearly 4,000,000. 

But we are ahead of our story, for in the spring 
of 1918 the number of American troops that had 
reached France was small. We had barely four 
divisions ready to go into battle. 

141. German Military Leaders Still Hope that 
American Troops Will Reach France too Late. — The 
German military leaders still hoped — and with 



114 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Our ship- 
building 
army 
550,000 
strong 



good reason, as they believed — that American 
troops could not reach France in time to play an 
effective part in determining the military decision. 
According to their theory, the submarines had 
been so destructive and would continue to be such 
a menace that the transportation problem could 
not be solved. They knew what the world learned 
from an official British statement made on March 
21, 1918, namely, that from August, 1914, to 
January, 1918, 11,800,000 gross tons of allied and 
neutral shipping had been sunk, and that only 
about 6,600,000 tons had been built to take the 
place of the loss. They knew also that the 
Allies had a pressing need for every vessel that 
could be brought into service to transport food 
and other supplies for their soldiers and civil- 
ians. 

142. Wonderful Success of Our Emergency Fleet 
Corporation. — But again the German high com- 
mand made a serious mistake in its reckoning. For 
our Emergency Fleet Corporation, spurred by 
Germany's brutal submarine policy, had organized 
a colossal building programme, so that by the sum- 
mer of 1918 there were in the United States 151 
ship-building plants, with a ship-building army 550,- 
000 strong. This programme was carried out with 
such wonderful success that by the end of July, 
1918, 1,719,536 tons of shipping had been built, 
over 631,000 tons of which were produced in July 
alone. 



116 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Ludendorff 
confident of 
success 



The routing 
of a British 
corps 



143. Ludendorff's Plan for a Grand Offensive in 
the Spring of 19 18. — The speed of the Americans 
hastened the German military leaders. They 
planned; under the leadership of Ludendorff, who 
was in direct command of the German armies, 
a grand offensive in the spring of 1918 in order 
to bring about a military decision before large 
armies could be brought overseas from America. 
The break-up in Russia, as a result of the revolu- 
tion there, had released so many German troops 
that Ludendorff's armies now outnumbered those 
of the Allies by more than forty divisions, prob- 
ably not far from 600,000 men. He was there- 
fore confident of success'. His great offensive, 
stretching over a period of nearly four months, 
consisted of five Titanic "drives," or assaults, with 
the purpose of breaking through the allied line, 
separating the British and French armies, and 
capturing the Channel ports in the North, or Paris 
in the South. 

144. The First of the German " Drives " Launched 
on March 21. — The first of these "drives" was 
launched on March 21, when Ludendorff sent 
1,700,000 men in a giant assault upon the British 
army at the point where it touched the French 
lines. One of the British corps, being greatly out- 
numbered, was routed; and but for the unrivalled 
valor and self-sacrificing devotion of a small num- 
ber of neighboring troops, with a host of civilian 
engineers, transport, and ambulance men, and the 




GENERAL VON LUDENDORFF 



118 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



General 
Foch in 
supreme 
command 



N 



like, who rushed into the gap between the two 
armies of the Allies and stayed the on-rushing 
Germans until reserve forces could save the situ- 
ation, the Allies might have met with supreme 
disaster. For if LudendorfFs men had separated 
the French from the English, he might perhaps have 
crushed each army in turn, captured Paris, and 
most likely one or more of the Channel ports. 
With the military mastery of the Continent, he 
could then have devoted his entire attention to 
England. 

145. Darkest Days of the War; Two Results of the 
Bitter Experience. — The days following this first 
German " drive" of 1918 were the darkest of the war 
for the Allies. But the bitter experience had two re- 
sults, which conjointly were destined to beat Ger- 
many to her knees. The first was the putting of a 
single head — it was General Foch, the brilliant 
French leader — in supreme command of the allied 
armies. The second was the marvellous rapidity 
with which American troops were transported 
across the Atlantic to the western front. For this 
colossal achievement, which astounded Germany, 
and, in fact, the whole world, great credit is due to 
British shipping, which carried over more than half 
of the troops. 

146. American Soldiers Halt the German Advance 
at Chateau-Thierry. — In the third German drive, be- 
ginning May 27, which aimed to capture Paris, the 
American troops played a conspicuous part in 



120 THE CAUSES AND MEANING 

blocking the progress of the German army at 
Chateau-Thierry, a town which stands at a bend 
of the Marne River. It was on this battle-field 
that American soldiers not only halted the advance 
of the picked German troops, who, flushed with 
recent victory, were sweeping forward toward 
Paris, but forced them to give ground. 
Heroism To the American marines and the American 

Americans troops fell the honor of holding back the German 
drive at the point where the assault was the 
fiercest. And they did it with a heroism which has 
never been surpassed in the annals of warfare. 
Their valor was as memorable as that of Leonidas 
and his Spartan band at Thermopylae many cen- 
turies ago. 
The The American marines — who met the enemy in 

\f mTrlnes fight Belleau Wood in this battle of Chateau-Thierry— 
a°fms? y began the deadly struggle on June 2, a struggle 
superior which caused the loss, either in killed or seriously 
wounded, of more than half their entire force of 
8,000 men. For almost an entire month they 
fought, every man a hero. For days at a time 
they went without rest except when they were so ex- 
hausted that they fell asleep at their posts. Often, 
also, they went for days without hot rations, some- 
times with no food at all for a whole day and some- 
times for long periods without water. But out- 
numbered though they were — three, four, and even 
five to one — they fought doggedly on, week after 
week, until they had cleared Belleau Wood of 




From a photograph copyright by Brown Brotners 
MARSHAL FOCH 



enters the 
war 



122 THE CAUSES AND MEANING 

every German soldier. This was about the end 
of June. 

147. The American Soldiers at Chateau-Thierry 
Truly Represent the Fighting Qualities of the Entire 
American Army. — In this heroic struggle at Chateau- 
Thierry, the marines and the other American sol- 
diers truly represented the fighting qualities of 
the entire American army; and their remarkable 
achievement had unmeasured value, for the battle 
of Chateau-Thierry has been called the turning- 
point of the war. 
Why Italy 148. Italy Enters the War. — During this Titanic 

struggle on the western front, the Austrians, in the 
summer of 1918, made a great assault upon the 
Italian armies stretching along the Piave River 
in northern Italy. Italy had entered the conflict 
on the side of the Allies by declaring war upon 
Austria, in May, 1915, and in the summer of 
1916 upon Germany also. 

Her direct object was to annex certain neigh- 
boring territory. She had two reasons for this 
and both were patriotic. One was to reclaim 
territory to the north of the Alps called Italia 
Irredenta and thereby to include in her nation a 
large number of Italians who were unhappy under 
Austrian rule. The other was to strengthen her 
boundaries against Austrian attack, which from 
now on meant German attack also, for Austria had 
become virtually a German vassal. 

Austria, in granting northern Italy a grudging 




GENERAL CADORNA 



124 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



independence years before, had purposely fixed the 
boundaries so that she could at any time overrun 
Italy, while Italy could not harm her; and her 
Adriatic coast stretched opposite a large part of 




MAP OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 



The Italians 
advance into 
Austrian 
territory but 
are driven 
back 



Italy, with strong naval bases from which raids could 
easily be made upon the Italian coast. By entering 
the war Italy hoped not only to get rid of these 
dangers but also to give substantial aid to the other 
Allies by keeping great Austrian armies from re- 
inforcing Germany on the western front. 

149. The Italian Army Advances into Austrian Terri- 
tory; It Is Driven Back in the Autumn of 19 17. — In 
the early stages of their fighting the Italian armies 
under General Cadorna, though they had to force 



THE GREAT WAR 125 

a passage over high steep mountains, or along the 
slippery surfaces of massive glaciers, slowly and 
with remarkable skill fought their way a consider- 
able distance into Austrian territory; and later 
threatened to pierce to the heart of Croatia, which 
hated its Hungarian rulers, rouse it to revolt, and 
so lay open the Hungarian plain to attack, taking 
Austria in the rear. But in. the autumn of 1917, a 
huge army of Austrians and Germans caught Cador- 
na's left wing unguarded in the Alps, and drove 
them in terrible rout into the Italian plain above 
Venice, capturing enormous masses of men, food, 
guns, and munitions. They were only stayed at the 
Piave River near Venice by the aid of British and 
French reinforcements that were hurried thither. 

150. The Austrian Army Meets with Supreme The Italians 
Disaster; Austria Surrenders. — Here in the summer Austrians 
of 1918 the Teuton Powers launched a last des- 
perate offensive to complete their work. They 
hoped to force Italy to abandon the war and pay 
them an immense indemnity, or at the least to 
weaken the Allies in France by making them send 
a large force to Italy to avert the disaster. This 
time the Italians under their general, Diaz, with 
their allied companions from the western front, 
routed the Austrians as thoroughly as they them- 
selves had been routed the year before, and seri- 
ously menaced with capture the entire Austrian 
army penned against the Alps, when Austria sur- 
rendered. 



126 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Marshal 
Foch 

launches an 
irresistible 
counter- 
offensive 



Marshal 
Foch honors 
the American 
troops 

y — "4 



151. The Allies Win a Decisive Victory at the 
Second Battle of the Marne. — Meanwhile, the furi- 
ous struggle continued on the western front. On 
July 15 Ludendorff began his last assault, but it 
was halted in three days. For on July 18 Marshal 
Foch launched an irresistible counter-offensive, 
which was not to end until the Germans capitu- 
lated on November 11. Again, as in September, 
1914, the Marne was the scene of a decisive Ger- 
man defeat. Here, for a second time, heavy 
masses of reserve troops about which the Ger- 
mans had no knowledge — made possible this time 
by the American help — were hurled with terrific 
force against the German army. Disorganized 
and thrown into confusion, it was forced to re- 
treat across the Marne with heavy losses of men 
and guns. This second battle of the Marne was 
quite as decisive as the first. 

152. Marshal Foch, in His Wonderful Counter- 
Offensive, Keeps up a Ceaseless Hammering Cam- 
paign. — From that day forward, for the next three 
or four months, Marshal Foch kept up a ceaseless 
hammering against the German line, striking first 
at one point and then at another, all the way from 
the Channel on the north to St. Mihiel on the south, 
the allied armies making a constant advance. By 
the last of September, the German armies were in 
full retreat toward their own frontiers. 

153. The Americans Advance with Resistless 
Might as They Fight Their Way to Victory Through 
the Argonne Forest. — As at Chateau-Thierry, Mar- 




GENERAL DIAZ 



128 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING 



Two gate- 
ways of 
escape for 
the Germans 



The 

Americans 
cut the 
enemy's 
main line of 
communica- 
tion 



shal Foch honored the American troops by intrust- 
ing to them a task of supreme difficulty and of the 
gravest importance. They were to fight their way 
through the Argonne Forest, which, because of 
its ravines, hills, and elaborate defenses hidden 
from view by dense thickets, had been regarded 
by the Germans as impregnable, and then cut the 
German main line of communication in the rear. 
The success of this venture would bring catastrophe 
upon the German armies in France and in Belgium, 
for there were only two gateways of escape for the 
vast enemy hordes with the countless tons of guns 
and military supplies which they had been accu- 
mulating for more than four years. One of these 
gateways was at Liege, in the north, and that was 
too narrow. The other was at Sedan, behind 
the Argonne and it was the closing of this wide 
outlet of escape that was assigned to the Amer- 



icans. 
tt 



On November 2," said General Pershing, who 
was in command of all the American forces in 
France, "the advance movement became an 
onslaught which could not be stayed. On the 6th, 
a division of the First Corps reached a point on 
the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty-five miles from 
our line of departure. The strategical goal which 
was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the 
enemy's main line of communication, and nothing 
but surrender or an armistice could save the army 
from complete disaster. v Ludendorff chose an ar- 




GENERAL PERSHING 



130' 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



Bulgaria's 
armies 
crumple up 
like paper 



mistice, which was in fact, as it turned out, an 
unconditional surrender. 

154. America Not too Late in Reaching the Battle 
Front in France. — During this great counter-attack, 
the Americans had thirty divisions on the battle 
front in the onrush for Sedan, and ten more ready 
to fill up the ranks, although when LudendorfT 
began his grand offensive in March, we had, as you 
will recall, but four divisions ready to go into battle. 
America was not too late in reaching the battle 
front in France. 

155. Bulgaria's Surrender and Its Disastrous Effect 
upon the German Plans. — The supreme disaster 
which crushed the hopes of Germany was made 
plain to all by the signing of the armistice on 
November 11. This world event had been hast- 
ened by the collapse of each of her allies on other 
battle fronts. In September the great force of 
the Allies so long lying inactive at Saloniki, with 
their Greek and Serbian allies to the west, had 
suddenly moved forward in one great surge, the 
Allies having private advices that the Bulgarian 
people were sick of the war, and would not support 
their German king in carrying it on longer. Bul- 
garia's armies had crumpled up like paper; her 
fortresses and all her southern border had been 
rapidly occupied; and with the capture of all her 
forces but a few days off, she accepted terms of 
unconditional surrender, including the right of the 
Allies to send their armies through Bulgarian terri- 
tory to take Austria in the rear. 



THE GREAT WAR 131 

Bulgaria's collapse entirely severed the commu- The end of 
nications between Germany and Turkey. Worse m ^encein 
still, it put an end to all Teutonic influence in p^J^^ 11 
the Balkan Peninsula, for Serbia's small remain- 
ing army, already half-way toward reconquering 
their homeland, at once reoccupied it all; and the 
patriot Greeks, led by Venizelos, had already driven 
out their treacherous Hohenzollern queen and her 
pro-Hohenzollern husband. 

156. The Unconditional Surrender of Turkey. — a great 
Moreover, the success of the British in the East SeEnjKh 
had driven the last nail in the coffin of German 
schemes in Asia. Late in September, 1918, the 
British army under General Allenby had in a few 

days, with one tremendous strategic blow, com- 
pletely overwhelmed the Turkish force in Syria 
and Palestine, capturing over 70,000 troops with 
the entire Turkish artillery in that region. This 
loss could only be replaced from Germany, as 
Turkey had no artillery of her own, and of course 
artillery could not be spared or conveyed from 
Germany. This made the Mesopotamian Turkish 
army, now cut off from all supplies, so helpless 
that it very shortly surrendered. The Turkish 
Government therefore followed its Bulgarian ally 
in unconditional surrender. 

157. Germany, in Signing the Armistice, Makes an Germany 
Unconditional Surrender.— Four days later (No vem- [e^ro^hi 
ber 4), with her provinces in revolt and her emperor the fi fjd and 
on the point of flight, Austria agreed to an armistice home 



132 THE CAUSES AND MEANING 

which was in effect unconditional surrender also. 
Just one week later, Germany, facing hopeless rout 
in the field and anarchy at home, signed a similar 
armistice to save her lands and cities from the 
horrors and atrocities which, she expected, would 
be visited on her in retaliation for her own de- 
testable deeds. At the same time, with her ac- 
customed hypocrisy, she boasted that her armies 
were unbeaten and that Germany's soil had never 
submitted to an invader. The Great War, so far 
as campaigns and battles were concerned, was at 
an end. 



CHAPTER XI 
A NEW WORLD 

Germany's 158. Bismarck and the Monroe Doctrine. — After 

sSemeT the war had ended in the defeat of Germany there 
were many revelations of facts that were previously 
only guessed at, and it became an easy matter 
to convict Germany out of her own mouth of the 
responsibility of bringing on the war. 

Long before this war broke out, Bismarck had re- 
ferred to the Monroe Doctrine as an " international 
impertinence"; and as late as 1913, one of Ger- 
many's most conservative writers on international 
problems wrote: "Considered in all its phases, the 
Monroe Doctrine is in the end seen to be a question 
of might only and not of right." This undoubtedly 



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PREMIER LLOYD GEORGE 



134 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

meant that when Germany should become powerful 
enough, she would carry out her ambitious schemes 
in America, in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine or 
any other form of protest from the United States. 
German 159. Attitude of Germany toward the United 

attacking States. — Still more significant is the following 
America statement, made by a German diplomat to an 
American army officer, in the years immediately 
following the Spanish-American War: " About 
fifteen years from now my country will start her 
great war. She will be in Paris in about two months 
after the commencement of hostilities. Her move 
on Paris will be but a step toward her real object — 
the crushing of England. Everything will work 
like clockwork. We shall be prepared and others 
will not be prepared. Some months after we finish 
our work in Europe, we shall take New York and 
probably Washington, and hold them for some 
time. We will put your country in its place with 
reference to Germany. We do not purpose to take 
any of your territory, but we do intend to take a 
billion or more dollars from New York and other 
places." 
The Kaiser's One more quotation may be made here to in- 
toward 6 dicate the attitude of Prussianized Germany toward 

America the United States. "The Emperor was standing," 
says James W. Gerard, our ambassador to Berlin, 
when writing of an interview he had on October 
22, 1915, "so naturally I stood also; and according 
to his habit ... he stood very close to me, and 



THE GREAT WAR 135 

talked very earnestly. ... He showed, however, 
great bitterness toward the United States, and re- 
peatedly said: 'America had better look out after 
this war'; and 'I shall stand no nonsense from 
America after the war. ' " 

160. Grand Scheme of German War-Lords for 
World-Domination. — None of these statements need 
surprise us. It is now certain that the German 
war-lords had planned, as a first step in their grand 
scheme of world-domination, to conquer France 
and Russia. Then, as they believed, Germany 
would become so powerful that she would be able 
to break up the British Empire, annex the English 
colonies, and force England to give up all her war- 
vessels. With these accretions to her strength, she 
would find it comparatively easy to bring under 
her sway the United States and all of the American 
Continent. 

It was therefore quite evident that our country what we 
was fighting for something more than her rights fou s htfor 
upon the seas. She was fighting for her rights as a 
free people. She was fighting to prevent Germany 
from making her a dependency. 

161. The German Point of View. — In carrying 
out this ambitious scheme, the war-mad Kaiser 
and his followers, goaded on by the predatory in- 
stinct, were acting in defiance of law and of human 
rights. Prussia had grown in power by robbing 
her neighbors. The German Empire was following 
her example. 



136 THE CAUSES AND MEANING 

The words of 162. The American Point of View. — The Ameri- 
wiison* can view-point was absolutely different. In the 
words of President Wilson, words that truly voice 
the sentiments of his countrymen, from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific: "What we [Americans] seek is the 
reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed 
and sustained by the organized opinion of man- 
kind." 
and Abraham This noble sentiment strongly reminds us of that 
expressed by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg 
speech when he said that "government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth." 
The words of Contrast this American ideal of government with 
the Kaiser ^^ p resen t ec [ ^y William jj a ft e r he had been 

crowned as German Emperor: "Considering my- 
self as the instrument of the Lord, I go on my way 
. . . and so I am indifferent to the views and the 
opinions of the moment." 
Freedom or 163. Contrast Between the Ideal of Autocracy and 
IsTpeopie 118 that of Democracy.— This statement of the Kaiser 
represented the ideal of autocracy; the words of 
Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson express 
the ideal of democracy. The conflict between 
these two opposing ideals of government — gov- 
ernment of all by one and the rule of all by the 
people themselves — had its outward expression in 
the Titanic war in which more than 10,000,000 
lives were blotted out, and many million more were 
mutilated or diseased for life. It was a war be- 




From a photograph copyright by Brown Brothers 
PREMIER CLEMENCEAU 



138 



THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 



The struggle 
was for the 
rights of all 
nations 



An enduring 
peace 



tween democracy and autocracy. It was a war 
whose issue was to determine whether the world 
should be free or should be enslaved by Germany 
— the last great embodiment of the barbarian prin- 
ciple of autocratic rule, which is an anachronism 
in a world where the rights of the people are 
respected. 

President Wilson declared that America was 
fighting to make the world safe for democracy; 
and Lloyd George declared : " Our real enemy is the 
war spirit fostered in Prussia. There will be no 
peace in the world until the shrine of the war spirit 
in Potsdam is shattered, and its priesthood is dis- 
persed and discredited forever." 

164. The Great War a Deadly Struggle Between 
Civilization and Scientific Barbarism. — These two men 
meant practically the same thing. The world 
could not be made safe for democracy except by 
crushing Prussian militarism. It was for civiliza- 
tion — in its deadly struggle with scientific barbar- 
ism — that England; France, the United States, and 
the other allied Powers were fighting. It was 
for the rights of all nations, large or small, powerful 
or weak. It was for the principle that " right 
makes might/' against the mediaeval conception 
of international relations that " might makes 
right." 

165. The Results of the Operation of Right and 
Justice in World Relationships. — When right and jus- 
tice prevail in world relationships, when small and 



THE GREAT WAR 139 

weak nations are allowed to govern themselves, and 
work out their own destiny in their own way so long 
as they are fair to other nations, we shall have a new 
world. We shall not have a peace which is merely 
a truce between one war and another; we shall have 
an enduring peace, because it will be founded not 
only upon right and justice, law and reason, but 
upon friendship and good-will. 

Great armies and navies will then be unneces- 
sary, because international fears and suspicions and 
hatreds will be superseded by mutual trust and help- 
fulness and the spirit of co-operation in carrying 
forward the work of civilization. 

In our own Federal Union, the small state of safety for 
Rhode Island or Delaware is just as safe, politically ^weakest 
and economically, as great New York or Texas. P e °P les 
The same should be true of the smallest and weak- 
est peoples in the great family of nations; and such 
will be true, when law and reason and right and 
justice play the same part in international relations 
as they do in the relations between individual men 
and women in a highly civilized country like Eng- 
land or France or the United States. 

166. Our People Willing to Make any Sacrifice Our people 
Because Inspired with the Sense of the Sacredness of make S any 
Their Cause. — Believing that the world should be sacrifice 
"made safe for democracy" — in Serbia, Poland, 
and Belgium, as well as in England, France, and 
the United States — our people were willing to make 
any sacrifice, even to the extent of billions of their 



140 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF 

treasure and millions of their young men, to crush 
the power of Prussian militarism and Hohenzollern 
autocracy. They believed that until this was ac- 
complished there could be no enduring peace. We 
sought no territory and no material gain of any 

We were kind. We were fighting, from April 6, 1917, until 

holy cause* 1 November 11, 1918, in a holy cause. Alive to 
the danger that threatened America and the world, 
we fought with patience and courage and stern 
determination until the hour of victory. Never 
did soldiers go to battle in a more heroic spirit. 
Inspired with a sense of the sacredness of their 
cause, the American boys were more than a match 
— man for man — for the finest picked troops that 
the German high command could lead against 
them. 

We were "all 167. Never Were We as a People so Firmly United. 

comrades" — Tlais same f ee j m g expressed itself in the loyal 
service of those at home in their encouragement 
and support of the American boys on battleships, 
on submarine destroyers, and in the trenches. 
Never were we as a people so firmly united. Con- 
fident that our cause was righteous, that we bat- 
tled for justice and for freedom, we were "all 
comrades" in a mighty struggle, shoulder to shoul- 
der, to win victory for our own country and for the 
freedom of the world. 

The new 168. America's Moral Leadership Among the Na- 

tions. — The Great War was a turning-point in 
history. The day of mediaeval militarism is ended, 



THE GREAT WAR 141 

and we are entering upon a new epoch. Let us be 
proud and thankful that America did her share in 
making the New World, and that she now occupies a 
position of moral leadership among the nations. 



PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

1914 

June 28 — Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to 
the Austrian throne, and his wife, at Serajevo, Bosnia. 

July 23 — Ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Serbia. 

July 28 — Declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. 

July 31 — Mobilization of Russian troops. 

Aug. 1 — Declaration of war on Russia by Germany. 

Aug. 2 — Declaration of war on France by Germany. 

Aug. 4 — Declaration of war on Germany by Great Britain, be- 
cause Germany refused to recognize the neutrality 
of Belgium. 

Aug. 4-26 — Invasion of Belgium by Germany. The country 
overrun. 

Aug. 6 — Declaration of war on Russia by Austria-Hungary. 

Aug. 10 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by France. 

Aug. 12 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by Great Bri- 
tain. 

Aug. 16 — Arrival of British Expeditionary Force in France. 

Aug. 21-23 — Battle of Mons-Charleroi, Belgium. Dogged retreat 
of French and British into France. 

Aug. 26 — Severe setback of Russians at Tannenberg. 

Aug. 26 — Conquest of Togoland, Africa, by the British and 
French. 

Aug. 28 — First big naval battle of the war at Helgoland, won by 
British. 

Sept. 5 — Treaty signed by Great Britain, France, and Rtnssia, 

agreeing not to make a separate peace. 

143 



144 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

Sept. 6-10 — Battle of the Marne. Germans stopped in their 
advance toward Paris by the French, and driven 
back from the Marne to the Aisne River, where the 
battle-line remained stationary for three years. 

Sept. 22 — Sinking of three British armored cruisers by a German 
submarine. 

Oct. 9 — Occupation of Antwerp by Germans. 

Oct. 16-28 — Battle of the Yser. Germans stopped in their ad- 
vance by Belgians and French. 

Oct. 17-Nov. 17 — First battle of Ypres. Germans repulsed in 
their drive for the Channel ports by Belgians, French, 
and British. 

Nov. 5 — Declaration of war on Turkey by France, Great Britain, 
and Russia. 

Nov. 7 — Capture of Tsingtau by the Japanese. 

Nov. 10-Dec. 14 — Invasion of Serbia by Austria. 

Dec. 16 — Bombardment of the unfortified British towns of West 
Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby by German 
warships. Defenseless non-combatants killed. 

Dec. 24 — First German air-raid on England. 

Aug. 4-Dec. 31 — German shipping practically driven from the 
seas. 

1915 

Jan. 24 — British naval victory in the North Sea off Dogger Bank. 

Jan. 28 — Sinking of an American merchantman, William P. Frye, 
by a German cruiser, although Germany was not at 
war with the United States. Violation of inter- 
national law. 

Feb. 4 — Proclamation by Germany of "war zone" around the 
British Isles after Feb. 18. Commerce of neutrals 
restricted. 

Feb. 18 — Beginning of submarine campaign of "piracy and pil- 
lage" by Germany. 



PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 145 

Feb. 19- Jan. 8, 1916 — Allied attack on the Dardanelles. Troops 
landed at Gallipoli finally withdrawn. 

Mar. 1 — Announcement of British blockade of Germany. 

Mar. 17 — Capture of Przemysl by Russians, strengthening their 
hold on Galicia. 

Mar. 28 — Sinking of the British steamship Falaba. Ill lives lost. 
First American killed by a German submarine. 

Apr. 17-May 17 — Second battle of Ypres. Asphyxiating gas 
used by Germans in violation of international law. 
Germans again failed to break through to the Chan- 
nel ports. 

Apr. 28 — Attack on American steamship Cushing by a German 
airplane. 

May 1 — Attack on American steamship Gulflight by German 
submarine. Two Americans killed. 

May 2 — Battle of the Dunajec. Russians compelled to retire 
from Galicia. 

May 7 — Sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania by German sub- 
marine. 1,154 lives lost, including 114 Americans. 
Women and children killed. 

May 23 — Declaration of war on Austria by Italy. 

June 3 — Recapture of Przemysl by Austrians and Germans. 

July 12-Sept. 18 — Conquest of Russian Poland by the Germans. 

July 15 — Conquest of German Southwest Africa by the British. 

Aug. 4 — Capture of Warsaw by the Germans. 

Aug. 19 — Sinking of the White Star liner Arabic. 44 lives lost, 
including two Americans. 

Aug. 20 — Declaration of war on Turkey by Italy. 

Sept. 8 — Recall of Austrian ambassador demanded by United 
States on proof of German intrigue in the United 
States. 

Sept. 18 — Fall of Vilna. End of Russian retreat. 

Sept. 26-Oct. 2 — French offensive in Champagne. 

Oct. 6-Dec. 2 — Conquest of Serbia by Austrians, Germans, and 
Bulgarians. 



146 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

Dec. 10 — Dismissal by the United States of German naval and 
military attaches on proof of further German intrigue 
in the United States. 



1916 

Feb. 16 — Capture of Kamerun, German West Africa. 

Feb. 21-Nov. 3 — Siege of Verdun. Verdun, a fortified city in 
France, is a "military key" to the Western Front. 
Violent assaults were made upon it by the Germans 
with terrific losses of men and two of its forts were 
captured. Later the French regained practically all 
they had lost. 

Mar. 8 — Declaration of war on Portugal by Germany. 

Mar. 24 — Sinking of the cross-Channel steamer Sussex. 80 killed 
or wounded, including two Americans. 

Apr. 17 — Capture of Trebizond by Russians. 

Apr. 18 — Ultimatum of United States to Germany, stating that 
unless Germany abandoned her methods of subma- 
rine warfare the United States would sever diplo- 
matic relations. 

May 16- June 3 — Attack on Italians by Austrians through the 
Trentino, a part of "Italia Irredenta." 

May 31 — Naval battle off Jutland, won by British. 

July 1-Nov. 26 — Battle of the Somme. Failure of the Allies 
to drive Germans from strong positions in northern 
France. 

July 9 — Arrival of a German commercial submarine at Balti- 
more, in attempt to break the Allied blockade. 

Aug. 9 — Capture by Italians of Gorizia, an important city en 
route to Trieste. 

Aug. 27 — Declaration of war on Germany by Italy. 

Aug. 27 — Entrance of Rumania into the war on the side of the 
Allies. 



PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 147 

Oct. 11-Jan. 15, 1917 — Invasion of Rumania by the Teutons. 
Dee. 12 — German peace offer. Rejected by the Allies as "empty 
and insincere." 

1917 

Jan. 10 — Statement of peace terms by Allies, demanding "resto- 
ration, reparations, indemnities." 

Jan. 31 — Announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare by 
Germany in violation of international law. 

Feb. 3 — Severance of diplomatic relations between the United 
States and Germany, and dismissal of the German 
ambassador. 

Feb. 24 — Reoccupation of Kut-el-Amara by the British. 

Feb. 28 — Publication of a note from Germany to Mexico, reveal- 
ing Germany's plan for an alliance with Mexico and 
a Mexican invasion of the United States. The Presi- 
dent of Mexico was to secure Japan's consent to these 
plans and mediate for a peace between Germany 
and Japan. Japan at once denied any connection 
with these schemes. 

Mar. 11 — Capture of Bagdad by British. 

Mar. 11-15 — Revolution in Russia. Czar forced to abdicate. 

Mar. 12 — Announcement of "armed neutrality" by the United 
States. American merchantmen armed for defense 
only. 

Mar. 17-19 — Retirement of Germans on the West Front to the 
"Hindenburg Line," a stronger line of defense. 

Apr. 6 — Declaration of war on Germany by the United States. 

Apr. 9-May 14 — Battle of Arras. British pursued retreating 
Germans and captured Vimy Ridge, threatening 
Lens. 

Apr. 16-May 6 — Battle of the Aisne. French dislodged Germans 
from strong positions held by them since the Battle 
of the Marne. 

May 4 — Great Italian offensive on Carso plateau. 



148 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

May 15-Sept. 15 — Arrival of American destroyers in the "war 
zone." Co-operation with Allied navies. 

May 18 — Enactment of the Selective Draft Law in the United 
States. 

June 15— First Liberty Loan. $2,000,000,000 offered. $3,035,- 
226,850 subscribed. 

June 26 — Arrival of first American Expeditionary Force in France. 
General Pershing in command. 

July 31 — Beginning of great British and French offensive in 
Flanders. 

Aug. 19 — New Italian drive on Carso plateau. 

Aug. 27 — President's reply to Papal peace overtures, stating aims 
of United States in the war — necessity of ending Ger- 
man militarism to insure permanent peace. Reply 
endorsed by Allies. 

Sept. 13 — Capture of Riga, Russia, by Germans. 

Oct. 26-Dec. 30 — Great German-Austrian counter-attack on 
Italians on Carso plateau, driving them back into 
Italy. Venice saved by Italian defense holding the 
enemy at the Piave River. 

Oct. 26 — Declaration of war on Germany by Brazil. 

Oct. 27— Second Liberty Loan. $3,000,000,000 offered. $4,617,- 
532,300 subscribed. 

Nov. 7 — Overthrow of Kerensky and the Provisional Govern- 
ment of Russia by the Bolsheviki. 

Nov. 22-Dec. 13 — Battle of Cambrai. Initial British gains some- 
what cancelled by later successful German counter- 
attacks. 

Dec. 7 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by United 
States. 

Dec. 9 — Capture of Jerusalem by the British. 

Dec. 10 — Conquest of German East Africa by the British. 

Dec. 23 — Peace negotiations between Germany and Russia. 
Armistice signed between Germany and the- Bolshe- 
viki. 



PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 149 

Dec. 26 — Management of the railroads in the United States taken 
over by the United States Government. 

1918 

Jan. 31 — United States troops in first-line trenches in France. 

Feb. 5 — Sinking of British steamer Tuscania, a transport for 
United States troops. 212 Americans lost. 

Feb. 9 — Treaty of peace, Germany and Ukraine. 

Feb. 10 — Withdrawal of Russia from the war. 

Feb. 11 — Demobilization of Russian troops. 

Feb. 17 — Renewal of Italian campaign against Austrian invaders. 

Mar. 3 — Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany and Russia. 

Mar. 5 — Treaty of Bucharest, Germany and Rumania. 

Mar. 21 — Beginning of new German offensive on West Front for 
distance of 150 miles. Battle of Picardy. Bom- 
bardment of Paris by German long-range guns. 

Mar. 28 — Appointment of General Ferdinand Foch as Generalis- 
simo of all the Allied forces on the West Front. 

Mar. 29 — Brigading of Americans with French and British troops 
on West Front. 

Apr. 6— Third Liberty Loan. $3,000,000,000 offered. $4,170,- 
019,650 subscribed. 

Apr. 11 — Control of principal coastwise steamship lines taken 
over by LTnited States Government. 

Apr. 19 — Arrival of Italian troops on the West Front. 

Apr. 23 — Successful raid on German submarine bases at Ostend 
and Zeebrugge by British and French. Both har- 
bors blocked. 

Apr. 29 — Section of French line on West Front taken over by 
United States troops. 

May 25 — Beginning of German submarine raids on shipping in 
waters off the eastern coast of the United States. 

May 27 — Resumption of German offensive on West Front. 



150 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

May 28 — Capture of Cantigny by United States troops. 

June 5 — Advance of Germans toward Paris again stopped at the 
Marne. 

June 15 — Austrian offensive against Italians for distance of 97 
miles from Asiago to the sea. 

June 23 — Withdrawal of Austrian troops across the Piave. Fail- 
ure of offensive. 

July 9-11 — Successful Allied advance in Albania. 

July 15 — German offensive on 60-mile front from Chateau-Thierry 
nearly to the Argonne. 

July 15 — Occupation of Murman coast by British and American 
troops. 

July 18-Aug. 15 — Counter-offensive by French and Americans 
from the Aisne to the Marne. Capture of Chateau- 
Thierry. Elimination of Marne salient. 

Aug. 1 — Control of all telegraph and telephone systems taken 
over by United States Government. 

Aug. 8-Sept. 18 — Elimination of salients pointing toward 
Amiens, Compiegne, and Ypres by Allies. Retreat 
of Germans to, and, in some places, beyond the Hin- 
denburg line. 

Aug. 15 — Landing of American troops at Vladivostok. 

Sept. 3 — Recognition by the United States of Czecho-Slovaks as 
a belligerent nation. 

Sept. 6 — Retreat of Germans on 90-mile front from the Aisne to 
Cambrai. 

Sept. 11 — Landing of American troops at Archangel. 

Sept. 12 — Registration for war service of men from 18 to 45 years 
of age not previously registered, throughout the 
United States. 

Sept. 12-14 — First independent American offensive. St. Mihiel 
salient, held by the Germans for four years, wiped 
out. Front in Lorraine established and Metz threat- 
ened by Americans and French. 



PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 151 

Sept. 14 — British advance toward Cambrai and St. Quentin. 

Sept. 18 — Allied advance in Macedonia against Bulgarians. 

Sept. 19-27 — British and French forces in Palestine, assisted by 
Arabs, destroy Turkish army. 

Sept. 21 — British break the Hindenburg line. 

Sept. 26 — Americans attack between the Meuse and the Aisne 
Rivers on 20-mile front and break through Hinden- 
burg line for several miles. 

Sept. 27 — Bulgaria asks for an armistice. 

Sept. 28 — Belgians begin attack in Flanders. French, English, 
and Americans press their attacks along whole front 
with success. 

Sept. 28— Fourth Liberty Loan. $6,000,000,000 offered. $6,989,- 
047,000 subscribed. 

Sept. 29 — Armistice is signed with Bulgaria. 

Oct. 1 — Damascus is occupied by British and Arabs. 

Oct. 2 — Germans begin extensive retirement from • Northern 
France. 

Oct. 2 — Bulgarians evacuate Serbia. 

Oct. 3 — Austrians withdraw from Albania. 

Oct. 4 — King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates. 

Oct. 5 — Austria-Hungary appeals to President Wilson accept- 
ing his peace principles and proposing armistice and 
peace parley. 

Oct. 8 — President Wilson replies, asking if his terms are fully 
accepted and if the chancellor speaks for the people. 

Oct. 8 — Turkey asks for peace. 

Oct. 17 — Hungarian Parliament declares independence of Hun- 
gary. 

Oct. 24 — Allied forces begin great offensive between the Brenta 
and Piave Rivers in Italy. 

Oct. 29 — Formation of a Czecho-Slovak Republic is announced. 

Oct. 30 — Insurrection in Budapest. People and troops proclaim 
Hungarian Republic. 



152 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 

Oct. 31 — Turkey signs armistice. 

Oct. 31 — Austria asks for armistice. 

Oct. 31 — Kingdom of Great Serbia, including Bosnia and Herzo- 
govina, proclaimed. 

Nov. 1 — Americans attack on wide front north of Verdun. 

Nov. 2 — King Boris of Bulgaria abdicates and Peasant Govern- 
ment is formed. 

Nov. 3 — Formation of Jugoslav Republic is announced. 

Nov. 3 — Austria signs armistice. 

Nov. 5 — American Government notifies German Government 
that Allies are willing to arrange armistice on Presi- 
dent Wilson's principles. 

Nov. 7 — Americans take Sedan, breaking main supply line of 
German Army. 

Nov. 9 — Kaiser and Crown Prince abdicate. 

Nov. 11 — Germany signs armistice. 

1919 
June 28 — -Germany signs Treaty of Peace. 



INDEX 



Adrianople, 56 

Adriatic, 88 

Albania, 46, 52, 53 

Albert, King, 63, 76 

Allenby, General, 131 

Alsace-Lorraine, 8, 11 

Arabic, the, 98 

Arbitration, 28 

Argonne Forest, 128 

Asia Minor, 39, 52 

Austria, 3, 4, 6, 60, 66, 67, 87; see 

Austria-Hungary 
Austria-Hungary, 14, 45, 49, 52, 

57-60, 62, 63, 88 

Balfour, Foreign Secretary, 
69 

Balkan Peninsula, 48, 49, 60 

Balkan States, 43, 45, 46, 49, 53 

Balkan Wars, 51-59 

Beatty, Admiral, 89, 92 

Belgium, 70, 72, 79, 80, 93 

Berlin, 88 

Berlin to Bagdad Railway, 40, 
42, 43, 60 

Bernhardi, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33 

Bernstorff, German ambassador, 
97 

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, Chan- 
cellor, 28, 70, 71 

Bismarck, Otto von, 4, 5, 9, 10, 
14, 15, 18, 22, 27, 31, 32, 132 

Bosnia, 46, 48, 49, 50, 59, 66 

Bosporus, 86, 87 

British navy, 88 

Brussels, 72 

Bulgaria, 6, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 86, 
88, 130, 131 

Cadorna, General, 123, 124 
Carpathian Mountains, 88 
Cathedral, Rheims, 101 
Chateau-Thierry, battle of, 118- 

120 
Clemenceau, Premier, 137 
Colonies, German, 32-36 
Constantinople, 48, 49, 85, 88 



Dardanelles, 48, 86, 87 
Denmark, war with, 5 
Diaz, General, 125, 127 - 
Divine Mission, Germany's, 36, 

37 
Draft, Army, Bill, 111 
Dunajec, battle of the, 81, 82 

Edward, King, 28, 49 
England, 20-31, 36, 40, 67, 71, 86 
Expansion, movement of, 32 

Fleet, Emergency, Corpora- 
tion, 114 
Foch, Marshal, 118, 121, 126, 128 
France, 7, 8, 22, 23, 67, 70, 82 
Francis Ferdinand, assassinated, 

64 
Franco-Prussian War, 7, 8, 26 
"Frightf ulness," German, 100 

Galicia, 79, 80 
Gallipoli, 87 
George, Lloyd, 133, 138 
Gerard, Ambassador, 134 
German Emperor, 9, 15 
German Empire, 10-15 
Germany, 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 20-31, 
56, 57, 60, 62, 69, 86, 88, 96-104 
Great Britain, 20, 96, 111 
Greece, 51, 53, 56, 86 
Greeks, 46 
Grey, Sir Edward, 65 

Hague, The, 27 

Hamburg to the Persian Gulf 

scheme, 40, 42 
Heine, the poet, 36 
Herzegovina, 46, 48, 49, 50, 59 
Hoover, Food Administrator, 

105 

India, 86 

"Influence, sphere of," 32, 35 

Italy, 2, 14, 122-125 

Jellicoe, Admiral, 91 
Joffre, General, 76-77 



153 



154 



INDEX 



Jugo-Slavs, 59, 60, 62, 63 

Tnnkprs 1 

Jutland,' battle of, 90, 91 

Kaiser, 15-20, 22, 24, 30, 41, 50, 

74, 80, 134 
Kiauchau, 32 
Kiel Canal, 12, 68, 89 
Kiel Harbor, 89 
Kitchener, Lord, 95 
Kluck, von, General, 76 
Kultur, 24 

Liege, 72, 128 

Lincoln, Abraham, 136 

Lorraine, 8 

Louvain, 72, 73 

Ludendorff, General, 116, 117, 

128 
Lusitania, sunk, 97 

Macedonia, 50, 58 

Magyars, 59, 60 

Maps : Snowing Berlin to Bagdad 
Railroad, 41; showing Balkan 
States, 57; route of the Ger- 
man armies through Belgium, 
74; showing western front, 78; 
the Eastern theatre of the war, 
81; the Turkish theatre of the 
war, 84; map of Italian cam- 
paign, 124 

Marne, battle of the, 76, 77, 126 

Maunoury, General, 78 

Mesopotamia, 26, 39, 52 

Militarism, 50 

Monroe Doctrine, 132 

Mons, 76 

Montenegro, 57, 59 

Morocco, 43, 44 

Moslems, 41 

Munster, Count, 27 

Namur, 76 
National unity, 2, 3 
Neutral trade, 94, 96 

Pan-Germanism, 38, 40, 42, 44, 

52, 58, 61 
Paris, 8 

Pershing, General, 128, 129 
Persia, 86 



Piave River, 122, 125 
Potsdam Conference, 64 
Powers, the five great, 2 
Prussia, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 135 

Rumania, 56, 88 
Russia, 22, 23, 46, 48, 49, 66, 67, 
68, 79, 86 

Saloniki, 130 

Scheer, von Admiral, 90 

Schleswig-Holstein, 12 

"Scrap of paper," 71 

Sedan, 128 

Selective Service law, 111 

Serajevo, assassination at, 64 

Serbia, 41, 48, 51, 52, 53, 58-60, 

62, 64-66, 87, 88 
Serbians, 46, 51 
Ship-building in the United 

States, 114 
Sims, Admiral, 167 
Submarine warfare, 97-104, 114 
Suez Canal, 86 
Sultan, the, 41 

Tannenberg, battle of, 79 
Teutonic Powers, 52 
Transylvania, 88 
Treitschke, 24, 25 
Triple Alliance, 14, 22 
Triple Entente, 22, 23 
Turkey, 51, 58, 84, 85, 131 
Turkish Empire, 39, 40, 88 
Turks, 51, 62 

United States, 92, 93, 94, 99, 
100, 103, 104, 134, 135 

Verdun, battle of, 82-84 
Victor Emmanuel, 3 

Wars: with Denmark, 6; with 

Austria, 6; Franco-Prussian 

War, 7 
White, Andrew D., 27 
William I, 4 
William II, 15-17, 39, 58, 63, 70, 

136 
Wilson, President, 92, 104, 106, 

136, 138 



